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ABSTRACT 
 
 The US Army Corps of Engineers has adopted the design-build project delivery 
method as a means to produce military facilities faster and cheaper.  An analysis was 
conducted on 119 military construction projects executed by the US Army Corps of 
Engineers.  While design-build awards may be made earlier in the delivery of military 
construction projects the design-build project delivery method was shown to have larger 
contract time growth compared to design-bid-build projects.  Military design-build projects 
experienced a lower total cost of change orders as well as a reduced change order cost 
associated with field changes.  
 Finally, statistical analysis demonstrated that no significant difference existed in 
design-build performance based on the type of facility being constructed.  This result 
indicates that the design-build project delivery method will work equally well on all types of 
military construction projects. 
  
1 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
      The delivery of military construction (MILCON) projects from need identification to 
beneficial occupancy is a lengthy and lockstep process.  The process is outlined in various 
Army regulations and is intimately tied to Congressional authorizations and appropriations.  
Authorized construction project delivery methods are specified in various parts of the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR).   
 
1.1 - The Medical Military Construction Delivery System 
       The existing medical MILCON (Med-MILCON) process has been described as 
cumbersome and slow, often requiring 7 to 12 years from initial planning to facility 
occupancy.  This protracted period of time results from the regulatory, statutory and 
legislative requirements to plan, approve, fund, design, and construct the medical facility and 
frequently results in facilities failing to meet timely market needs.  The standard plan-design-
bid-build delivery process used for many Med-MILCON projects is sequential; with many 
pauses to conduct progress reviews and obtain approvals before proceed to the next step 
(Quadrennial, 2006).  For instance, the designer is required to provide a block plan submittal, 
schematic design submittal, design development submittal, 35 percent design submittal, final 
design submittal, and 100 percent/final submittal.  A formal value engineering study is 
required after the design development submittal which seeks to lower life-cycle costs while 
still complying with all regulatory requirements.  The 35 percent design submittal requires a 
formal presentation to the Portfolio Planning and Management Division/Tricare Management 
Agency (TMA) in order to obtain final scope and costs. (Unified, 2003) 
      The design-bid-build (DBB) project delivery method for Med-MILCON projects is 
outlined in Army Regulation 415-15, Army Military Construction Program Development and 
Execution.  Acknowledging the shortcomings of the traditional Med-MILCON design-bid-
build project delivery method, some individuals and organizations have advocated the use of 
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construction management and/or design-build (DB) project delivery methods.  Their 
justification is based on the premise that projects may be delivered more rapidly if the 
number of incremental steps may be reduced and/or allowed to overlap.  For example, the 
planning process for a Department of Defense (DoD) medical facility normally takes six 
years (Uhlik, 1999).    Included in this time is the identification of the need for renovation or 
new construction, estimating of the cost, programming of the funds, and receipt of 
authorization.  Design authorization for Med-MILCON projects is usually received two years 
prior to the project’s programmed fiscal year for construction.  The bidding period requires 
advertisement for a minimum of 30 days, and may be longer depending upon the time of the 
fiscal year in which the project is advertised and the complexity of the project.  At the 
conclusion of this solicitation period it may take several weeks to award the construction 
contract and issue notice to proceed.  Optimization of this process is possible when design-
build is used. 
      The design-build project delivery method for Med-MILCON projects is outlined in 
Engineer Regulation 1180-1-9, Design-Build Contracting.  This regulation authorizes the use 
of the design-build project delivery method and requires each district commander within the 
US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to develop formal design-build procedures within 
their geographic region. (Engineer, 1999)  These procedures were then reviewed by the next 
higher major subordinate command, which would typically be the division.  Finally, the 
regulation goes on to specify project characteristics that should be present in order to 
effectively utilize the design-build project delivery method. 
 
1.2 - The Changing Face of Medical Military Construction 
 The US Army Health Facility Planning Agency (USAHFPA) was formed as a key 
field-operating agency of the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army in 1975 (OTSG, 
1975).  The Surgeon General has since designated this agency as his representative for the 
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health facility construction program, Med-MILCON.  As such, the early role for the 
USAHFPA centered on design-bid-build project delivery of medical construction projects. 
 The MILCON program has been instrumental in developing much of the Army’s 
original inpatient medical infrastructure.  However, because of the regimented process and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies it is not uncommon for projects to take as many as 10 years to 
proceed from programming through completion of construction.  (Petersen, 2004)  In defense 
of the USACE, this delay is not the fault of the USACE, rather the delay stem from 
legislative requirements and prescriptive, military-specific standards. 
 During the 1990’s, military downsizing produced an excess of inpatient capability.  
Simultaneously, there was a shift in healthcare delivery from inpatient care to a focus on 
wellness and outpatient care.    This paradigm shift in healthcare delivery affected the use 
and functionality of medical facilities, worldwide.  Facilities originally constructed to hold 
patients in beds for extended periods of time required rapid conversion into outpatient 
clinical space.  The traditional MILCON program was not flexible enough to support this 
need.  Therefore the US Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM) and the USAHFPA 
worked with the US Army Corps of Engineers to develop what became known as the renewal 
program.  This program was based on the design-build concept and the much shorter turn 
around time was a critical feature for meeting the healthcare delivery needs of US Army 
health care providers.  However, funding limitations on this program were such that projects 
had to be kept below the minimum threshold requirement for MILCON funding, typically 
$1.5M for new construction or $3M to correct life safety deficiencies.  There were other 
caveats as to what constituted new construction versus what could be considered repair.  
Therefore,  these design-build projects were usually of lower dollar amounts than Med-
MILCON projects. 
 However, it was recognized early that there was a fundamental difference between the 
traditional design-bid-build project delivery method and the design-build renewal projects.  
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This led to the creation of a specific type of project manager within the USAHFPA to handle 
renewal projects and serve as user’s representatives to the project delivery process.  These 
project managers became known as project integrators and were responsible for projects from 
programming through completion and integrating these projects within the framework of the 
Army Surgeon General’s facility priorities. 
 A study was performed on the effectiveness of project integrators and their impact on 
renewal projects.  The results indicated that project integrators had a strong positive impact 
in producing project success while balancing scope, time, cost, and quality.  It was also 
determined that “soft” or people skills were important management techniques for project 
integrators. (Petersen, 2004) 
 Therefore, the USAHFPA has had success on smaller renewal design-build medical 
projects and identified that success of design-build projects hinges on approaching the project 
differently.  Design-build project success lies in its team-based collaborative delivery 
process, however, if an adversarial relationship develops the advantages of design-build are 
lost .  As of this writing, only one design-build hospital construction project above the 
MILCON threshold has been attempted by the USAHFPA, and is not considered an 
exemplary success due in part to this adversarial relationship.  However, it is expected that 
design-build usage will increase on future hospital construction projects. 
 
1.3 – Base Realignment and Closure 
 As part of the Quadrennial Defense Review many recommendations were made to 
change the existing project delivery method for Military Health System (MHS) construction 
projects.  For example: 
 “Current law, 10 U.S.C. § 2851, limits the ability of the MHS to leverage all 
possible market forces and choose from all possible entities who could potentially 
perform the direction and supervision of MILCON contracts by prohibiting the 
use of non-Government entities. According to [Department of Defense Directive 
(DoDD)] 4270.5 Military Construction, the MHS’s MILCON contracts must 
normally be carried out under the direction and supervision of either the Naval 
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Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) or the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE). However, the Secretary of Defense has the legal authority to 
waive this requirement. DoDD 4270.5 Military Construction delegates this 
authority to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics. There are several non-DoD construction agents, including the 
[Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA)], specializing in health care facility 
development, which may provide insight and experience useful to MHS 
transformation.” (Quadrennial, 16) 
 However, this restriction on using USACE and NAVFAC has been lifted for Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) projects.  With the authority laid out in DoDD 4270.5, 
paragraph 4.3.5, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
has granted a blanket waiver from the required use of the DoD designated construction 
agents. This waiver is without prejudice from internal DoD construction agents. The intent of 
the up-front blanket waiver is to allow for a fair and open competition among all Federal 
agents, including DoD agents, for the MHS medical BRAC projects (excluding the Medical 
Education and Training Center in San Antonio and the Brooks City Base in San Antonio). 
(Quadrennial, 18) 
 The BRAC process placed the following requirements on projects funded with BRAC 
funds: 
• Complete all BRAC medical projects by September 15, 2011. 
• Eliminate all internal DoD prescriptive requirements and build to industry standards 
with performance requirements for anti-terrorism/force protection (ATFP) and life 
cycle management. 
• Solicit industry input as part of the contracting process prior to award for design and 
construction. 
• MHS develops source selection criteria for acquisition needs. 
• Designate the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) as the Source Selection 
Authority, and include both clinical and military facilities personnel on the Source 
Selection Board. 
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• Reduce supervision, inspection and overhead costs. (Quadrennial, 19) 
 In order to comply with these newly-imposed requirements, the Military Health System 
Office of Transformation (MHS-OT) will oversee the implementation of the following 
changes to the MHS internal management processes for all medical construction and 
renovation: 
• Transform the current specification-based process into a performance-based standards 
and criteria driven process. 
• Revise existing space and construction criteria to reflect use of accepted industry 
standards, codes, and best practices for design and construction, keeping specialized 
requirements only for ATFP and life cycle cost objectives. 
• Adopt performance-based contracts versus current prescriptive contracts 
• Largely eliminate change orders during construction. (Quadrennial, 18) 
 From these objectives, the apparent intent is to move toward a design-build project 
delivery methodology centering on performance specifications and contracts.  Furthermore, 
the current military-specific requirements and prescriptive specifications contained in 
Military Handbook 1191 or Unified Facilities Criteria 4-510-01 will be adapted to become 
performance oriented and representative of private-sector medical construction requirements.  
The most unique objective was the intent to largely eliminate change orders during the 
construction phase, which will be interesting to determine how successful MHS-OT will be 
in meeting this objective. 
 
1.4 – MILCON Transformation 
 A deployment order was issued on March 6, 2007 for Army activities to execute the 
business transformation principles of Lean Six Sigma.  Former Secretary of the Army Francis 
Harvey’s intent was to apply these principles to more than the Army’s logistics systems.  The 
principles are being applied to administrative services, installations, military construction, 
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recruiting, medical operations, and human resources.  The goal of implementing Lean Six 
Sigma was to “get more output from the same amount of money.” (Burgess, 2006) 
 As part of this business transformation, the military construction process is being 
overhauled.  The USACE has recognized that the existing MILCON system, with its reliance 
on design-bid-build project delivery, will not produce quality facilities in the timeframe 
needed.  Therefore, the USACE has embarked on a process known as MILCON 
Transformation.  The USACE has defined that MILCON Transformation will be successful 
if it is able to reduce project delivery costs by 15% and achieve a 30% time savings while 
simultaneously meeting Army/DoD requirements (i.e. LEED, small business requirements, 
etc.). (Temple, 2006)   
 In order to attain the aggressive cost reduction goals the USACE will make a 20% 
reduction in cost estimates based on the current design criteria and simultaneously establish 
this amount as a cost limitation in the project RFP.  (Tyler, 2006)  MILCON Transformation 
goals require standardization of the acquisition process by maximizing the use of mandatory 
template RFP’s.  This should streamline the acquisition process and facilitate the proposal 
process through the application of standardized requirements. Similarly, there will be a 
standardized set of evaluation and selection criteria. (Temple, 2006)  Philosophically, this 
process will allow faster contract execution while maximizing the offeror’s flexibility and 
innovation thus attaining the 15% reduction in project delivery costs.  During fiscal year 
(FY) 2006 the USACE has shown that MILCON transformation achieves the 15% cost 
savings while maintaining 100% project scope on the following projects: 
• Aviation barracks at Fort Campbell, KY 
• Permanent party barracks at Fort Knox, KY 
• Division and brigade headquarters at Fort Riley, KS 
• Brigade and battalion headquarters at Fort Carson, CO 
• Brigade combat team complex at Fort Bliss, TX  (Valine, 2006) 
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 In addition to a standardized RFP, projects will maximize use of the International 
Building Code (IBC) and/or other civilian code requirements to focus on the end result, not 
the “how to.” (Temple, 2006)  This is a move from military-specific, proscriptive 
requirements and mirrors recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review and BRAC 
requirements noted above.  All of these acquisition changes point toward an initial shift from 
design-bid-build toward design-build.  
 Starting in FY07, standardized designs will be developed for standard facility types in 
order to facilitate the transition from design-build to an “adapt-build” project delivery model.  
The focus will also shift from site built facilities toward pre-engineered or modular facility 
solutions.  The impact of these changes on medical construction projects could potentially 
change the way health clinics are developed and constructed.  However, hospital 
requirements are based on the demographic patient populations, which change with location.  
Therefore, hospitals are usually unique and may not benefit greatly from standardized design 
efforts.  Design-build, rather than adapt-build, may be the future of military hospital 
construction under MILCON Transformation. 
 Finally, to further facilitate the goals of MILCON Transformation the USACE is 
simultaneously implementing an internal reorganization.  Divisions remain responsible for 
projects within their geographical region under this reorganization through their Regional 
Business Centers (RBC).  The business activities of the Districts comprising the Divisional 
boundaries are regulated by the RBC.  The Division RBC’s primary responsibility is to assist 
in allocation of resources among the subordinate Districts.  As such, Districts are expected to 
share expertise, manpower, and resources within Divisional boundaries.  Select Districts have 
been identified as Centers of Standardization (COS) for a specific facility type (i.e. barracks, 
dining facilities, vehicle maintenance, etc).  The COS will export current request for proposal 
requirements to any other District for execution, worldwide.  The COS will similarly compile 
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lessons learned on projects executed by sister Districts and assimilate them into the RFP 
requirements for the next project.  The goal is to use the design-build project delivery method 
and rapidly collect lessons learned and prepare standardized designs for each type of facility.  
Ultimately MILCON Transformation will use the standardized designs and lessons learned to 
progress beyond design-build to an “adapt-build” project delivery method. 
 
1.5 – The Road Ahead 
 Dissatisfaction with the performance of traditional, design-bid-build Med-MILCON 
projects has led to the mandated use of alternative project delivery methods for military 
medical construction projects.  The first step in changing the facility delivery paradigm is the 
use of design-build project delivery methods on BRAC-funded projects.  Simultaneously, the 
USACE will change the way facilities are delivered, initially increasing the use of the design-
build project delivery method.  This will eventually change toward the use of standardized 
designs and a move from design-build toward adapt-build.   
 In summary, the current paradigm of military medical facility delivery is being 
influenced by many, external factors.  Essentially, the cumulative effect of these factors will 
shift project delivery methods from design-bid-build toward design-build with the desired 
end state being an adapt-build delivery method.  The only thing that is certain is that future 
medical construction projects will be delivered differently than they have been in the past. 
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 – History of Design and Construction 
 
2.1.1 – Master Builder 
 Historically, the design-bid-build project delivery method is a relatively recent 
development.  Originally, one individual was charged with both project design and 
construction and this individual was known as a Master Builder.  The Code of Hammurabi 
specifically addressed the work of the builder in sections 228 through 233 as follows: 
228.  If a builder build a house for someone and complete it, he shall give him (the 
builder) a fee of two shekels in money for each sar of surface. 
229.  If a builder build a house for someone, and does not construct it properly, and the 
house, which he build fall in and kills its owner, then that builder shall be put to 
death. 
230.  If it kill the son of the owner, the son of that builder shall be put to death. 
231.  If it kill a slave of the owner, then he shall pay slave for slave to the owner of the 
house. 
232. If it ruin goods, he shall make compensation for all that has been ruined, and 
isasmuch as he did not construct properly this house which he build and it fell, he 
shall re-erect the house from his own means. 
233. If a builder build a house for someone, even though he has not yet completed it; if 
then the walls seem toppling, the builder must make the walls solid from his own 
means. (Beard, 2001) 
These codes infer that the builder must know the design requirements for a particular 
structure and then construct the building using traditionally accepted means and methods.  
Hence, the builder may be considered a design-builder by current terminology. 
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2.1.2 – Separation of Design and Construction 
 The sole source responsibility for project design and construction continued until the 
1400’s.  The first known, intentional separation of design and construction occurred in Italy 
in the mid-fifteenth century when Leon Battista Alberti, a papal secretary, convinced Pope 
Eugene IV that he could direct the activities of a master mason constructing a new facade on 
a Gothic church in Florence, Italy.  Alberti furnished the plans for his buildings but never 
supervised their construction.  (Beard, 2001) 
 The Industrial Revolution further divided the fields of design and construction.  
However, the significant cause of absolute separation of the design professions from the 
construction trades was the Miller Act of 1935.  (Beard, 2001)  This law required a contractor 
on federal projects exceeding $100,000 to post performance and payment bonds.  Since 
bonds are a form of credit to issue a surety bond, the surety must be confident that the 
contractor possesses the capital assets to reimburse the surety in the event of a default.  It is 
this requirement for capital that has prevented or discouraged all but the largest design firms 
from acting as construction contractors. 
 
2.1.3 – Resurgence of Integrated Project Delivery 
 It is believed that the first publicly funded design build project in the United States was 
awarded in Indiana in 1968.  This project utilized performance specifications drafted by the 
school district for the construction of a school building using the design-build project 
delivery method.  The award was based on a best value determination and, in fact, the 
contract was not awarded to the low bidder.  Apparently, this project met the owner’s 
requirements because the process was repeated in 1970 in an adjoining county again in 1971.  
(Beard, 2001)   
 In 1969, Congress and the Secretary of Defense authorized the use of turnkey 
construction to deliver military housing.  The intent was to draw upon the experience of 
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speculative builders and rapidly deliver military housing at a reduced cost. (Molenaar, 1999)  
Another early application of design-build by the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) was 
the 1976 relocation of the historic Gruber Wagon Works in Berks County Pennsylvania as 
part of a civil works project. (Gruber, 2006)  The success of these early experiments with the 
design-build project delivery method expanded in the 1980’s. 
 The Brooks Act of 1972 ensured the acquisition of professional design services by the 
federal government was qualifications based rather than low bid.  The Brooks Act did not 
affect the 6% fee limit for architectural and engineering services on federal construction 
projects which had been enacted in 1939. (Charles, 1996) 
 However, in January 1992 the Huntsville District of the USACE issued an innovative 
RFP for design-build services to construct the John J. Sparkman Center at Redstone Arsenal, 
Alabama. The RFP identified a maximum bid amount, the minimum acceptable finishes, and 
the function/purpose of the project. Each prospective bidder was to develop a concept design 
that would be evaluated and used in the selection of the winning contractor. Since the price 
of the contract was fixed, contract would be awarded to the proposal which provided the 
most facility for the money. The independent Government estimate (IGE), prepared before 
the RFP was issued, estimated that based on the funding limit and specified level of finishes 
the Government should expect a facility of approximately 543,000 gross square feet. 
 By September 1992 the contract had been awarded and notice to proceed issued to 
Centex-Rooney Construction Company from Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Their successful 
proposal resulted in a 686,790 gross square foot facility for the specified contract amount. 
(History, 2006) Furthermore, their proposal utilized fast-track construction techniques that 
resulted in a beneficial occupancy date two years ahead of the contract performance period 
identified in the RFP. 
 One item of note regarding the Sparkman Center project was underscored in an article 
written in Engineering News Record.  It was reported that the 15 unsuccessful bidders on the 
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project were upset regarding the amount of design effort and the associated costs that were 
required as part of the proposal process. Overall, an estimated $4 million was expended to 
prepare proposals by the 16 firms pursuing the Sparkman Center project.  All proposals were 
required to be developed to a 20-30% level of design completion. (Setzer, 1992)  This 
resulted in the call to reform how design-build projects were solicited and awarded. 
 In 1996, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act was signed into law and marked the first 
major change in how federal agencies acquired A/E design services in 20 years.  This act 
required qualifications based selection as established by the Brooks Act and specified 
procedures for federal agencies to follow when entering into a design-build project.  The 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act authorized a two-phase process for selection of design-build 
contractors. (Charles, 1996)  Presumably, this two-phase process was meant to prevent a 
Sparkman Center recurrence whereby 16 proposals and preliminary designs had to be 
prepared and evaluated.  However, the 1996 legislation did not go as far as to explicitly 
authorize a federal agency to pay a stipend to an unsuccessful offeror for the costs of 
developing and submitting a proposal. 
 A stipend may reimburse the entire design effort or a percentage thereof to the 
unsuccessful proposer(s).  While not explicitly allowed or disallowed under the requirements 
of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) the payment of stipends had been limited.  
However, in September 2004 the USACE Office of Counsel issued guidance on the payment 
of stipends in order to encourage competitive bidding on D-B projects.  (Use, 2004)  
Furthermore, the stipends were not intended to offset the entire design effort of the 
unsuccessful bidder; rather the stipend would be limited to an unnamed percentage.  In fact, 
the legal distinction noted by the Chief Counsel was that the use of a stipend was to increase 
competition and not simply to pay a contractor’s design costs. (Use, 2004) 
 The implementation guidance was issued by the USACE on May 19, 2005 and 
attempted to limit the Government’s financial exposure on stipends by limiting its use to two-
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phase procurements. (Engineering, 2005)  Unlike previous uses of stipend, that required the 
end-user to “pay the bill,” the Corps of Engineers planning and design (P&D) funds were to 
be used to pay stipends, with pre-approval. (Engineering, 2005) 
 In an effort to prepare for an increased amount of design-build workload stemming 
from Army transformation and BRAC requirements a standard medical design-build RFP is 
currently being drafted.  Draft copies propose the usage of stipends on an optional basis and 
suggest that stipend amounts not exceed 50% of the estimated cost of proposal development. 
(Model, 2006)  Furthermore, the draft RFP specifies a two-phase solicitation process with the 
maximum number of phase-two offerors capped at four.  (Model, 2006) 
 
2.2 – Need for Change 
 
2.2.1 – Historic Cost Overruns 
 The traditional, design-bid-build project delivery method is perceived as an efficient 
way to establish the fair market price and eliminate the possibility of favoritism or 
corruption.  (Gordon, 1994)  However, in many cases the costs of public design-bid-build 
projects may be far greater than the contract award amount.  
 Literature has shown that 9 out of 10 transportation infrastructure projects are 
underestimated. (Flyvbjerg, 2002)  For road projects, actual project costs average 20% more 
than originally estimated, while rail project costs average 45% over estimates.  This same 
literature also indicates that this cost escalation problem is not any more likely on 
transportation infrastructure projects than other types of large construction projects. 
(Flyvbjerg, 2002) 
 If cost overruns are not exclusive to transportation projects; they are to be expected on 
building projects.  A recent, high profile military construction project experienced problems 
with cost escalation on traditional, design-bid-build contracts.  Part of the $1.222 billion  
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 Pentagon renovation ballooned from $50 million to $125 million for one segment of the 
basement overhaul. (Winston, 2000)  This was one of many problems that plagued the early 
efforts on the Pentagon renovation.  Ultimately, it was decided to change from the traditional 
project delivery methodology to innovative application of the design-build project delivery 
method. 
 
 2.3 – Theoretical Benefits of Different Project Delivery Methods 
 
2.3.1 – Design-Bid-Build 
 The traditional, design-bid-build project delivery method consists of an owner entering 
into two separate contracts.  On federal projects, one contract is entered into with a designer 
and the award is qualifications based in accordance with the Brooks Act.  A separate contract 
is awarded to a contractor for construction services.  The award of this construction contract 
is normally arrived at from competitive bidding but may be based on “best value.”  The 
project is executed in a linear fashion through the programming, design, bidding, and 
construction phases. 
 The owner’s advantages of this project delivery method include control over the design 
of the project, a “known” total price, competition, and impartial selection. (Gordon, 1994)  
This project delivery method is also well suited when the project is clearly definable and fast 
tracking is not required. 
 
2.3.2 – Design-Build 
 According to Part 36.102 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) design-build 
“means combining design and construction in a single contract with one contractor.”  The 
FAR goes on to state“[t]wo-phase design-build selection procedures” as a selection method 
in which a limited number of offerors (normally five or fewer) is selected during phase one to 
submit detailed proposals for phase two.  (FAR, 2007)   
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 Literature outlines potential benefits of using design-build as: 
• Shortening the duration of projects by overlapping design and construction (fast-
tracking) and/or eliminating bidding time. 
• Providing flexibility for changes during construction, without paying a premium 
for it. 
• Creating more designer/contractor teamwork by reducing adversarial 
relationships. 
• Allowing a contractor to participate in the design process and therefore enhance 
constructability. (Gordon, 1994) 
 Under the traditional, design-bid-build approach the Government was liable to the 
construction contractor for design deficiencies.  The Government then attempted to recoup 
the costs associated with these deficiencies through the A/E’s errors and omissions insurance.  
Though the single source of responsibility the design-build delivery method extricates the 
Government from this litigious process and shifts the risk associated with design errors to the 
design-builder.  In essence the design-build project delivery method assigns this risk of 
design errors to the party best able to manage the risk.  
 Other works have further specified the advantages and disadvantages of the design-
build project method based on the acquisition strategy employed.  Review of Table 1, below 
reveals a common thread among the disadvantages.  Specifically, the use of the design-build 
project delivery method does not shield the owner from protests from unsuccessful or 
inadequate offerors.  In contrast, anecdotal evidence suggests that a low bid award is seldom 
protested. 
2.4 – Current Research of Design-Build vs. Design-Bid-Build 
 
2.4.1 – Federal Construction Council Design-Build Study (1993) 
 In 1993 a study was published by the Federal Construction Council outlining 
experiences federal agencies with the design-build project delivery method. Like the current 
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Table 1.  Advantages and disadvantages of design-build acquisition methods. (Molenaar, 
1998) 
Form of design-build Advantages Disadvantages 
Single-phase • Allows for award on 
overall value (price and 
technical) 
• Designs that exceed 
minimum 
specifications can be 
realized 
• Delivers a product that 
most closely conforms 
to the user’s 
expectations. 
• Burdensome to 
evaluate multiple 
proposals 
• Greatest chance of 
delays due to protests 
from inadequate 
offerors 
• Costly preparation for 
offerors 
• May require the most 
detail in the RFP, 
placing a burden on 
the owner 
Two-phase • Allows for award on 
overall value (price and 
technical) 
• Allows for short-
listing, saving owner 
and offeror time and 
money 
• Offers wider range of 
design solutions 
• Delivers the best 
budget and schedule 
performance 
• Technical and design 
review process can 
become lengthy 
• Chance of delays due 
to protests from 
inadequate offerors 
during technical 
evaluations 
• If low bid award is 
chosen, all classic 
low-bid problems 
exist 
Qualifications-based • Allows for award 
solely on qualifications 
• Can be negotiated in 
single step 
• Allows Award with 
minimum design 
development 
• Is the least burdensome 
on the owner’s 
administration 
• Evaluation of 
technical proposal 
can be lengthy 
• Chance of delays 
from protesting losing 
offerors 
• Intensive owner 
design staff 
involvement may be 
required 
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study, the Federal Construction Council research was restricted to building construction 
projects, therefore the results of the study are directly applicable to building projects and may 
not be indicative of experiences with other project types. The results of this study were 
obtained from information submitted by seven federal agencies on 27 projects. Admittedly, 
this is a small sample population; however, it was indicative of the small volume of federal 
design-build work completed prior to the study. 
 In general, this study deemed the design-build approach to be at least as good as the 
traditional approach in all aspects except the amount of time required for planning and 
programming. (Experiences, 1993) This is indicative of the fact that a different type of 
request for proposal (RFP) process is required for a design-build project compared to that 
used in the traditional delivery method. A design-build RFP requires greater up-front 
planning and project definition by the Government. 
 Prior to this study it had been widely believed that the design-build approach was most 
appropriate for “simple” projects. However, of the 27 projects reported, only three were 
characterized as being of low or medium-low complexity. Therefore, the results of this study 
indicated that the design-build approach may be used successfully on a full spectrum of 
projects. (Experiences, 1993) 
 The majority the Federal Construction Council projects were acquired using a single-
phase evaluation procedure versus a two-phase procedure. In the single-phase approach, cost 
is one of several factors that are evaluated simultaneously in order to award the contract. In 
contrast, the two-phase approach considers cost separately after all proposals have passed 
other screening factors (usually capacity and experience). This preponderance of single-
phase design-build awards was unexpected since federal procurement officers traditionally 
favor the two-phase approach due to its ability to legally restrict the pool of prospective 
bidders to those likely to complete the project. (Experiences, 1993) 
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 The sample population in the Federal Construction Council study was stratified based 
on contract award amounts. This stratification resulted in a group of 11 projects ranging from 
$1M to $10M, a group of 8 projects ranging from $10M to $20M, and a group of 7 projects 
costing in excess of $20M. The results indicated that as the contract amount increased the 
design-build approach would be less successful. (Experiences, 1993) However, the small 
sample size and wide price ranges for each subgroup were inadequate to specifically 
determine a dollar amount at which the design-build approach would become less successful 
than the traditional approach. 
 This study also attempted to answer the question of how much, if any, design of a 
proposed facility should be completed prior to issuance of an RFP. Some study respondents 
believed that prospective bidders should be given a minimum amount of information in order 
to encourage creative solutions. Other study respondents believed a more developed design 
should be given to the prospective bidders in order to minimize the number of unresolved 
issues and potential change orders after award. This dichotomy resulted in a wide distribution 
of completed designs prior to issuance of the RFP. However, the poorest results were 
achieved when designs were 15% or less complete prior to award of the design-build 
contract. Intermediate results were achieved when greater than 35% design was complete 
prior to design-build contract award. The best project performance was noted when the 
design was between 15 and 35% complete prior to contract award. (Experiences, 1993) 
 
2.4.2 – Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Design-Build Construction 
Contracts (1993) 
 Another early study on the effectiveness of design-build project delivery methods 
concerned 11 child care centers constructed on multiple Navy installations.  The NAVFAC 
contracted for these projects using traditional, design-bid-build methods for five projects and 
variations of the design-build project delivery method for the remaining six.  Of the design-
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build projects, two were procured using a single-phase design-build acquisition and the other 
four projects were procured using the “Newport design/build method.” (Mouritsen, 1993) 
 The “Newport design/build method” was a unique procurement strategy employed by 
the NAVFAC which combined design-build’s single source of responsibility with lump-sum, 
competitive bids.  Under this method, bidders were not required to produce technical 
proposals.  Rather, the Navy would provide a performance specification and fundamental 
design parameters.  The bidders were then expected to perform final detailing of the projects.  
The contract also contained a clause that allowed it to be closed out if the Navy was not 
satisfied with the functionality or aesthetics of the facility after the design-builder completed 
the design. (Mouritsen, 1993) 
 As part of the evaluation between design-build and design-bid-build project delivery 
methods, the study calculated the percent increase between the program amount and the final 
cost of each project.  The program amount used for each project was based on the initial 
parametric cost estimate prepared by professional cost estimators prior to the selection of the 
project delivery method.  Therefore, the program amount was assumed to not favor one 
project delivery method over the other.  The study concluded that design-build project 
delivery resulted in a substantially smaller cost growth above the program amount than the 
design-build project delivery method.  Of the two design-build methods, the “Newport 
design/build method” performed better than single-phase acquisition methods. (Mouritsen, 
1993) 
 The small sample size of this study was reflective of the small number of design-build 
projects which had been completed by the USACE and NAVFAC.  In fact, during the period 
spanning 1985 through 1991 both NAVFAC and the USACE were limited to three design-
build project awards per year. (Mouritsen, 1993)  However, since the cap was lifted in 1992 
there has been an explosion in the number of design-build military construction projects. 
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2.4.3 – Comparison of Public and Private Owner Perspectives on Design-Build 
(1996) 
 Research has shown that design-build selection factors do not drastically differ between 
public owners and private owners.  Six design-build selection factors were identified and are 
summarized in Table 2, below. 
 
Table 2. Design-build selection factors. (Songer, 1996) 
SELECTION FACTOR DEFINITION 
Establish Cost Secure a project cost before the start of detailed design. 
Reduce Cost Decrease the overall project cost as compared to other 
procurement methods. 
Establish Schedule Secure a project schedule before the start of detailed 
design. 
Shorten Duration Decrease the overall project completion time as 
compared to other procurement methods. 
Reduce Claims Decrease litigation due to separate design and 
construction entities. 
Large Project Size/Complexity The project’s shear magnitude is too complex to be 
managed through multiple contracts. 
Constructability/Innovation Introduce construction knowledge into design early in 
the process. 
 
Table 3.  Comparison of design-build selection factors. (Songer, 1996) 
SELECTION FACTOR PUBLIC OWNER RANK PRIVATE OWNER RANK 
Shorten Duration 1 1 
Establish Cost 2 2 
Reduce Cost 3 4 
Constructability/Innovation 4 5 
Establish Schedule 5 3 
Reduce Claims 6 6 
Large Project Size/Complexity 7 7 
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 To test whether a difference in opinions existed between the public and private owners 
the researchers used hypothesis testing.  Results shown in Table 3, above, indicated the 
primary difference in public and owner perspectives were related to the “establish schedule” 
factor.  All other selection factors differed by one ranking between the two populations and 
indicated general alignment of priorities between the two owner populations.  It was 
concluded that both public and private owners tend to select design-build project delivery in 
order to shorten project duration. (Songer, 1996)  
 
2.4.4 – Reading University Design-Build Study (1996) 
 The 1996 University of Reading study was published by the Centre for Strategic 
Studies in Construction and involved a review of more than 330 building projects in the 
United Kingdom.  The number of projects evaluated yielded statistically significant results 
and used statistical regression analysis to construct models identifying variables affecting 
project performance.  (Bennett, 1996) 
 The researchers determined that the construction speed of design-build projects was 
12% faster than traditional approaches.  Furthermore, overall project delivery speed, 
including design and construction, was 30% faster than traditional methods.  The study also 
found that the certainty of completion on time increases the earlier the contractor is involved 
in the design process. (Molenaar, 2003) 
 Regarding cost performance, the researchers concluded that 75% of design-build 
projects were completed within 5% of budget, compared with 63% on traditional projects.  It 
was also found that design-build projects were at least 13% cheaper than traditionally 
procured projects. The greatest cost certainty on design-build projects were realized when the 
owner provided detailed project requirements. (Molenaar, 2003) 
 The study also concluded that clients had lower quality expectations when the design-
build project delivery method was utilized.  This was demonstrated by the fact that 50% of 
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design-build projects met the client’s quality expectations, compared to 60% for traditionally 
delivered projects.  Conversely, it was determined that owners paid a higher percentage to 
repair defects on traditional projects versus design-build projects.  Design-build consistently 
performed better in meeting quality requirements if the project was categorized as complex 
or innovative, rather than simple, standard or traditional. (Molenaar, 2003) 
 The report concluded that the design-build project delivery method can deliver projects 
faster and cheaper than traditional project delivery methods.  However, it was also concluded 
that the design-build project delivery method produced lower quality projects due in large 
part to the lowered expectations by owners.  Finally, the chances of success on design-build 
projects increased with early involvement of the design-builder. 
 
2.4.5 – Pennsylvania State University Study (1997)  
 In December 1997 a comprehensive study of project delivery methods was published 
by Pennsylvania State University and the Construction Industry Institute.  This study has 
been heralded by proponents of the design-build project delivery method as proof-positive of 
the benefits of design/build and was based on data collected from 351 projects (both public 
and private). The exact distribution of projects was 43% public to 57% private construction 
projects, which would indicate a slight skew of the results in favor of private construction 
projects.  However, the size of the sample population allowed for statistically significant 
results to be obtained. 
 From this study, the unit cost ($/sf) of design-build projects was shown to be nearly 
one-third lower than the traditional, design-bid-build project delivery method.  Similarly, 
design-build projects experienced a 2.12% cost growth versus 4.83% cost growth for 
traditional projects.  Finally, the Penn State study revealed that design-build delivery speed 
was 33% faster than traditional, design-bid-build project delivery. (Konchar, 1997) 
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 A comparison of these two large-scale studies is summarized in Table 4.  It is 
interesting to note how similar the results were despite the geographic separation of the two 
sample populations. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of results from Penn State and University of Reading studies. (Shane, 
2003) 
ITEM PENNSYLVANIA STATE 
UNIVERSITY 
UNIVERSITY OF 
READING 
Construction Speed DB 12% faster than DBB DB 12% faster than DBB 
Total Speed of Project 
Delivery 
DB 33.5% faster than DBB DB 30% faster than DBB 
Project Cost or Unit 
Cost ($/Area) 
DB 6.1% cheaper than DBB DB 13% cheaper than DBB 
DB     58% DB     75% Completion within 5% 
of budget DBB  47% DBB  65% 
DB     50% Meet Client’s Quality 
Expectations 
DB slightly better than DBB 
DBB   60% 
 
2.4.6 – Design Guidelines for Design-Build Projects (1998) 
 The amount of design completion prior to issuance of the request for proposal (RFP) on 
design-build projects is a careful balance between articulating the owner’s requirements, 
allowing the design builder flexibility to determine optimized construction methods, 
controlling costs, and clearly conveying required information to bidders. 
 The same level of design is performed in both design-build projects and traditional, 
design-bid-build projects. However, the detail of the design is greater for a design-bid-build 
project because the designer-of-record assumes that “the least qualified constructor” will be 
awarded the contract.  Therefore, the greater detail in the traditional delivery process is a 
method by the designer to prevent claims.  Furthermore, in the traditional delivery process 
the designer may have to account for multiple equipment choices which each bidder may use, 
rather than design for a specific piece of equipment. (Fredrickson, 1998)  For these reasons 
the design of design-build projects will not appear as owners may be accustomed to on 
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design-bid-build projects. The final design will contain only that information required to 
construct the project and the extra design effort is no longer required.   
 However, how much design is needed to convey the required information to the 
prospective bidders about a design-build project?  The American Consulting Engineers 
Council recommends that the design be approximately 35% complete prior to bidding. 
(Fredrickson, 1998)  It is believed that this level of design is adequate to ensure that the 
owner’s requirements are clearly articulated to the bidders.   At the opposite extreme is the 
Design Build Institute of America (DBIA), which advocates very limited design prior to the 
issuance of the RFP.  “Typically, 90 percent of the quality and value impact (financial and 
other) that a design-build entity can make occurs in the first 10 percent of the design effort.” 
(DBIA, 2007)   Clearly DBIA believes that early design should not proceed past 10% if the 
owner wishes to maximize the benefits of the design-build project delivery method.  The 
Federal Construction Council study discussed above advocated design completion at time of 
RFP solicitation of 15-35% for best project performance.  While projects have been 
successfully bid and constructed with both an under and overabundance of bidding 
information this is a decision that is up to owner and will yield differences in the projects. 
 The minimum designs to be provided to prospective bidders are project definition 
documents.  These documents are approximately equivalent to 5-10% of conventional design 
effort.  If an owner chooses to issue the RFP at this level of design they must be aware of the 
limitations.  For example, the less complete the design the more each bidder will have to 
assume in preparing their proposals.  This lowers the probability that the bids will use similar 
means and methods and result in a wider distribution of project costs.  Likewise, this 
complicates the bid evaluation process to determine the best value due to the fact that 
differing elements may have differing value to the owner. (Fredrickson, 1998)  In the case of 
federal project acquisition, the method of determining “best value” has to be clearly 
articulated in the instructions to bidders and this process opens a project up to potential 
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protests by unsuccessful bidders, if the solicitation is not handled properly.  Therefore, on 
important projects with tight timelines a 5-10% design effort prior to the RFP may result in 
greater risk of delay due to protest, regardless of the merit of the protest.  Conversely, this 
level of design development makes sense on projects where the owner desires a wide variety 
of processes and concepts to meet a project requirement. 
 There is a higher cost in bidding design-build projects at an increased level of design 
development because each prospective bidder may have a significant design effort to 
determine realistic schedules and costs as part of their bid. The increased cost of preparing 
design-build proposals may actually increase costs to the owner over time due to limited 
personnel and business development budgets of design-build firms. (Fredrickson, 1998)  The 
accumulation of these “sunk” costs in preparing unsuccessful proposals may prevent 
qualified firms from submitting proposals in the future and driving down competition on a 
project.  As the number of bidders on a project decreases it would be expected that their bid 
prices would increase.  To offset this potential the US Army Corps of Engineers may utilize a 
two-phase procurement strategy whereby only those potential design builders selected to 
continue to step two must prepare a proposal.  To further increase the likelihood of receiving 
competitive proposals the Corps of Engineers may pay a stipend to unsuccessful firms to 
offset some of the proposal development costs.  (Engineering, 2005) 
 Furthermore, the more uncertainty that design-builders have while bidding a project 
with 5-10% design development may result in increased contingency in their bids. The 
calculation of contingency is a major concern on competitive bid projects because as 
contingency increases the lower the probability that the bidder will be awarded the project. 
Conversely, too little contingency may result in an unsuccessful project for the design-
builder. (Fredrickson, 1998) 
 The primary method of overcoming these challenges is to provide prospective bidders 
with increased design information during the solicitation period.  If an owner has definite 
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requirements for the project these should be provided with the bidding information.  In the 
case of Med-MILCON projects this may include a room listing / program for design (PFD) 
along with the design criteria for each room. While the PFD is prescriptive in nature this 
document outlines the minimum requirements for medical construction that meet the defined 
medical need.  The design criteria are currently too prescriptive and contain exclusive DoD 
requirements not found in private sector medical facilities.  A more performance oriented set 
of design criteria are required if the full potential of the design-build project delivery method 
is to be realized on Med-MILCON projects. 
 The next level of design effort concludes with the completion of schematic design 
which correlates to an approximate conventional design effort of 15-20%.  It is important to 
note that as more information is provided the bidders have reduced flexibility to apply their 
construction expertise or competitive advantage to a project to obtain the “best value” 
solution. (Fredrickson, 1998)  This relationship is shown in Figure 2, below.  This graphic 
indicates a point where too much design completion may be provided to potential bidders and 
they may no longer be considered the designer-of-record on the project.  At this point it is 
questionable whether the project is design-build or if it has become design-bid-build. 
 
2.4.7 – Design-Build Selection Model (1998) 
 Research conducted at the University of Colorado at Boulder has led to the 
development of a predictive model based on five performance criteria that correlate design-
build project characteristics to success. The five performance criteria were budget variance, 
schedule variance, conformance to expectations, administrative burden, and overall 
satisfaction. The five performance criteria were further broken down using a total 26 
statistically significant variables. 
 The overall model was based on regression analysis of 122 questionnaires and case 
studies to obtain specific project data.  Of these projects, 104 were utilized to construct the 
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Figure 2.  Impact of Design Completion on Design-Builder Flexibility (Fredrickson, 1998) 
 
regression model and the remaining 18 projects were then used to test the model.  The model 
is actually five separate models – one for each of the performance criteria. The definition of 
success for each model is a comparison to the average result from the 122 case studies.  This 
assumes that each of the 122 studies was a successful application of the design-build project 
delivery method.   
 The research has led to the development of the Design Build Selection Tool, which is a 
web based application based on the regression models from this study.  This tool may be 
accessed at: http://www.Colorado.EDU/engineering/civil/db. 
 With regard to scope definition, the models indicate that the percent of design 
completion at the time of the RFP has no statistically significant effect on the success of a 
design-build project. (Molenaar, 1998)  This finding stands in direct conflict with earlier 
research which emphasized that higher scope definition (or higher percentage of design 
completion) at the time of RFP leads to lower cost and schedule growth.  The belief that 
30 
greater design is better is explained in an executive summary accompanying the Draft RFP 
for Medical Military Construction Design-Build Projects: 
 
“…when the contractor provides the owner a price, the price is on a 
specific product. The accurate definition of that product and certainty of 
its not needing to be changed after contract award will determine if the 
project can be built efficiently and without costly changes. The key to 
achieving this goal is communication between the users and the design 
team and between the design team and the contractor/ subcontractors.  
Design-Bid-Build allows the user to complete this interface with the 
designer before the contractor begins work. 
Design-Build requires that the user work with the design-builder but 
entirely within the bounds of the RFP documents. User generated 
unknowns that are not in the RFP documents are changes. Therefore, the 
more User information and User input that can go into the RFP 
preparation, the less of a problem this should be.” (Executive, 3) 
 
 The regression models indicate that projects were successful despite minimal design 
completion when the RFP was issued.  The explanation lies in the fact that there is a 
fundamental difference between scope definition and design completion.  In completing more 
design prior to RFP, the owner is constraining the creativity of the design-builder to deliver 
an acceptable project.  If the RFP provides a well-developed scope and clearly conveys the 
Owner’s needs and goals, the project was more likely to be successful regardless of the level 
of design completion.  Furthermore, the scope should be sufficiently flexible to encourage 
additions or improvements beyond the minimum requirements.  The most successful design-
build projects will use an RFP that defines the project scope but leaves room for contractor 
input. (Molenaar, 1998) 
 With regard to schedule definition the models indicated that schedule driven projects 
were an appropriate application of the design-build project delivery method. However, as 
noted above, design-build projects require a high level of owner participation during the RFP 
preparation and design stages. (Molenaar, 1998) 
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 The models indicate that it is possible to use project budget as a critical factor related to 
project success and thereby successful design-build projects will experience lower cost 
growth.  However, the cost growth will only be reduced on projects where owners make it a 
priority early and actively participate in project design in order to keep the project on budget. 
This also increases the administrative burden on design-build projects as examined 
previously. 
 The models determined that the method used to convey the budget to the design-build 
contractor was statistically significant.  However, the researchers only identified and 
examined three methods of conveying the budget to the contractor as scope constraint, 
maximum allowable price, or no conveyance.  The method of not conveying project budget 
to the contractor obviously yields the lowest probability of budgetary success.  The method 
of scope constraint will result in project scope being adjusted to fit the available budget.  
Application of the method of limiting scope to an available budget on a Med-MILCON 
project, which must support a given patient population, will likely increase the probability of 
not conforming to the users/patients expectations.  Traditionally, the scope of a Med-
MILCON project is not locked until the S-4 (35%) Design Submittal. (Unified, 2003)  
Therefore, in order to exercise scope constraint while simultaneously maximizing the 
likelihood of meeting user expectations on Med-MILCON design-build projects would 
require a level of project definition and space requirements equivalent to a 35% design.  The 
method of maximum allowable price method was found to lower owner’s administrative 
burden while simultaneously lowering the conformance to user expectations.   
 In regard to project complexity, the predictive model indicates that design-build 
actually produces greater satisfaction on projects with complex design issues. (Molenaar, 
1998)  The sources of complexity on a project may stem from design requirements, 
construction constraints, technology, specialized requirements, or compressed schedule.  In 
these situations the combination of the design and construction expertise by the design 
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builder allows for easier solution to the complex projects. Also, as has been shown by the 
Penn State and Reading University studies, the speed of delivery advantages of design-build 
can assist projects with compressed schedules.  Finally, by using one contract to turn all of 
these challenges over to the design-build contractor the risk to the owner is reduced, thus 
improving project satisfaction. 
 How the design-builder is selected may also affect the administrative burden to the 
owner.  Researchers stratified the project award methods into three categories: price only; 
qualifications-only; or a combination of price and qualifications. The models support the 
premise that owner’s expectations are best met when design-builders are selected through a 
combination of price and qualifications. (Molenaar, 1998)  The two-phase solicitation 
process may be considered a combination of price and qualifications because it limits 
potential proposals in the second step based on qualifications and awards the project based on 
value. Therefore, this finding supports the premise of the Federal Construction Council that 
federal contracting officers prefer two-phase solicitations.  The two-phase solicitation 
process is also being incorporated into MILCON Transformation Design-Build RFP’s, which 
further validates this finding. 
 Research also proposes that the prequalification process for design-build contracts 
lowers schedule growth and administrative burden. (Molenaar, 1998)  Prequalification allows 
the owner the opportunity to review each perspective bidder’s past performance as well as 
their capacity to perform the work.  Additionally it was discussed that a larger field of 
prospective bidders does not directly correlate to more competitive bids.  It is suggested that 
by restricting the pool of prospective bidders to no more than four, then more competitive 
bids may be received.  This process is being adopted in the Draft Medical Design-Build RFP 
being prepared by the USACE.  The RFP will use the two-phase procurement method and 
limit the number of proposals from prospective design builders in the second step to no more 
than four. (Model, 2006) 
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 Finally, this study acknowledged that a learning curve exists for public agencies 
attempting design-build for the first time.  These agencies experience better project 
performance if the first design-build project is a typical facility in their portfolio.  However, 
as an agency gains experience with design-build there is an unexpected effect on design-
build performance.  As design-build experience increases project performance is seen to 
decrease.  These projects exhibit larger cost growth, increased administrative burden, and 
decreased satisfaction.  (Molenaar, 1998)  The explanation for this trend was that as owner 
experience increased they lowered project contingencies and tightened scope requirements, 
which also affected how they perceived the project. 
 
2.4.8 – Public Sector Design-Build Performance (1999) 
 The performance of design-build projects were studied using a survey case-study 
methodology by researchers at the University of Colorado at Boulder.  Such a methodology 
does not allow for refinement of findings, as such, the results are rather general in nature. 
(Molenaar, 1999)  However, this study was based on approximately 79 case studies from 
multiple government agencies and represents a more robust data set than had been previously 
collected by the Federal Construction Council.   
 The results of this study indicated that 59% of design-build projects surveyed were 
within 2% of the original budget or better. This indicates a similar trend for publicly-funded 
design-build projects to the Penn State study regarding budget performance. Likewise, 77% 
of publicly funded, design-build projects were within 2% of the original schedule or better.  
(Molenaar, 1999)  This finding is also in line with general findings of the Penn State study 
showing an accelerated project delivery for design-build projects. 
 This study also arrived at the similar conclusions to the Federal Construction Council 
study regarding administrative burden.  The researchers determined that public-sector, 
design-build projects experienced slightly higher administrative burden than similar projects 
using different procurement methods. (Molenaar, 1999)  This finding is counterintuitive to 
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expectations that the administrative burden would diminish as the number of contracts 
involved in project is reduced from two to one.  The explanation offered for this relationship 
is that 34% of the owners responding to the survey had never attempted design-build before 
the project used in the case-study.  Therefore, they were observing the project’s performance 
in greater detail than similar projects delivered using traditional methods and this resulted in 
a perception of increased administrative burden for design-build projects. Also, 69% of 
respondents had completed less than three design-build projects which would indicate that 
the respective federal agencies had not achieved a “comfort-level” with the design-build 
method and were still watching the project’s performance in great detail.  (Molenaar, 1999)  
The final explanation for the increased administrative burden is the increased up-front effort 
required for RFP preparation and initial design for design-build projects. In the case of initial 
design and project definition for Med-MILCON projects the design effort is usually 
completed over two-years while other MILCON projects are normally designed over a one-
year period.  In design-build the design effort will have to be completed in months instead of 
years, resulting in an increased administrative burden on the federal agency to review 
designs.  
 One of the key conclusions of the study further illustrated what had been alluded to in 
the Federal Construction Council study.  Specifically, that design-build methods utilized by 
different agencies yielded different results.  This statement further justifies the decision by 
the Department of Defense to allow BRAC medical construction projects to potentially use 
construction agents other than the USACE. 
 
2.4.9 – Design-Build Highway Construction (2003) 
 An examination of the Federal Highway Administration’s Special Experimental Project 
Number 14 performance was conducted at the University of Colorado at Boulder.  As part of 
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this study projects were classified by size based on project costs.  The projects were divided 
into the following classifications: 
 1. Micro, <$2 million 
 2. Small, $2 million - $10 million 
 3. Medium, $10 million - $50 million 
 4. Large, $50 million - $100 million 
 5. Mega, >$100 million (Shane, 2003) 
 As will be shown later, the Micro to Medium categories are used in the current study.  
However, with the pending MILCON workload there will be project information available 
for the Large and Mega categories in the future. 
 
2.4.10 – Impact of Design Build Project Delivery on Project Changes (2004) 
 A study was conducted on 598 change orders on 120 separate construction projects 
performed by the same mechanical contractor.  The sample population was comprised of 
both design-build and design-bid-build projects and the purpose of the study was to 
determine if there was a difference in change orders based on the project delivery method. 
Change orders in this study were categorized as: 
1.  "Owner-generated" - change orders issued when an adjustment to the project 
scope, design, or detailing is requested by the owner. 
 2.  "Unforeseen" - often called field-generated change orders which are highly 
disruptive to labor productivity, as one or more trades are forced to interrupt planned 
work sequences, and at time, complete rework. (Riley, 2004) 
  The results noted that while the total number of change orders was close to the same for 
design-build and design-bid-build projects, there was an 87% decrease in the average number 
of unforeseen change orders observed on design-build projects vs. design-bid-build projects.  
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Additionally, the average size of unforeseen change orders was 86% smaller on design-build 
projects. (Riley, 2004) 
 Project engineers and/or Resident Engineers classify all change orders on military 
construction projects as either controllable or uncontrollable changes.  The exact definition of 
what is included in each type is explained in Appendix A.  In general, a controllable change 
would include any engineering change, construction changes necessary to complete the 
project, and value engineering changes. (RMS, 2.36)  The construction contractor or design-
builder is best able to control the cost and time impact of controllable changes.  An 
uncontrollable change included any discretionary, user-requested change which would equate 
to the owner-generated changes noted above. 
 
2.5 – Research Questions 
 The extensive volume of literature exploring the benefits of the design-build project 
delivery method coincides with the established goals in MILCON Transformation.  
Similarly, the directives from the Secretary of the Army as well as the recommendations of 
the Quadrennial Defense Review are pressing for expanded usage of the design-build project 
delivery method.  However, all of these research studies and the promised benefits of design-
build are tempered by the experience of this researcher on a design-build hospital project 
which did not experience any of the benefits traditionally associated with design-build 
project delivery.  Therefore, it was necessary to determine whether that one project was an 
anomaly or indicative of the performance of MILCON design-build projects. 
 To test determine the benefits of the design-build project delivery method on MILCON 
projects the following questions and hypotheses were developed:  
 
2.5.1 - Time 
 Is the design-build project delivery method faster than the design-bid-build project 
delivery method? 
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H0: No difference exists between design-build and design-bid-build project delivery methods 
regarding contract duration. 
H1:  Design-build projects will have shorter contract durations than design-bid-build projects. 
 
2.5.2 – Cost 
 Is a design-build project less expensive than a design-bid-build project 
H0: No difference exists between design-build and design-bid-build project delivery methods 
regarding contract cost. 
H2:  Design-build projects will have lower contract costs than equivalent design-bid-build 
projects. 
 
2.5.3 - Quality 
 How does the quality of a design-build project compare with a design-bid-build 
project? 
H0: No difference exists between design-build and design-bid-build project delivery methods 
regarding project quality. 
H3: Design-build projects will be of better quality than equivalent design-bid-build projects. 
 
2.5.4 - Facility Type 
 Is the design-build project delivery method better suited to one type of facility 
compared with the design-bid-build project delivery method? 
H0: No difference exists between the performance metrics of design-build or design-bid-build 
projects of a particular facility type. 
H4:  Performance metrics for design-build projects will differ from performance metrics for 
design-bid-build projects of a particular facility type. 
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 Is there a difference in the performance of the design-build project delivery method 
based on the type of facility? 
H0: No difference exists in the performance of design-build projects of differing facility 
types. 
H5: Performance of design-build projects differ by facility type. 
 
2.5.5 - Geography 
 Is the design-build project delivery method better suited to one geographic region 
compared with the design-bid-build project delivery method? 
H0: No difference exists between the performance metrics of design-build or design-bid-build 
projects in a particular geographic region. 
H6: Performance metrics for design-build projects will differ from performance metrics for 
design-bid-build projects in a particular geographic region. 
 
 Is the design-build project delivery method better that the design-bid-build project 
delivery method in a particular USACE district? 
H0: No difference exists between the performance metrics of design-build or design-bid-build 
projects in a particular district. 
H7: Performance metrics for design-build projects will differ from performance metrics for 
design-bid-build projects in a particular district. 
 
 Does the performance of the design-build project delivery method vary by USACE 
district? 
H0: No difference exists between the performance metrics of design-build projects in any 
district. 
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H8: Performance metrics for design-build projects in at least one district will differ from 
performance metrics for design-build projects in other districts. 
 
2.5.6 - Change Orders 
 Is there a difference between the types of change orders on design-build projects 
compared to design-bid-build projects? 
H0: No difference exists between change orders of design-build or design-bid-build projects. 
H9:  Change order metrics on design-build projects differ from change order metrics on 
design-bid-build projects. 
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CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
 The primary purpose of this research was to investigate and explore the questions posed 
in Chapter 2.  To accomplish this, data was collected and analyzed in order to develop 
answers.  The data collection and analysis phase follows the research protocol outlined 
below. 
3.2 – Research Protocol 
 The research model shown in Figure 3, below, served as a useful guide.  The 
observations which initiated this study arose from the USAHFPA’s application of the design-
build project delivery method to the Bagram airfield hospital located in Afghanistan (block 
1).  From this project, many observations were formed that fed into the problem definition 
and preliminary data gathering steps in the research process (block 3).  The literature survey, 
outlined above, drove the development of a theoretical framework and the identification of 
variables for analysis (block 4).  All of these steps led to the generation of a general 
hypothesis that there was no difference between design-bid-build and design-build project 
delivery methods on military construction projects (block 5).  The research design (block 6) 
is explained in section 3.3, below.  Data collection and analysis methodologies will be 
discussed over the remainder of Chapter 3 whereas the analysis and interpretation of results 
are discussed in Chapter 4 (block 7).  Finally, the outcome of the initial hypotheses and 
deduction regarding the research questions will be discussed in Chapter 5 (block 8). 
3.3 – Research Design 
 The research design was limited by the availability of reliable MILCON project 
performance data and necessitated an empirical analysis approach.  Many authorities on 
research maintain that empirical analysis provides strong evidence for explaining 
phenomena.  Quantitative research will be able to answer questions of ‘how much of a 
difference?’ but not necessarily the ‘why?’  (Walker, 1997)   
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Figure 3.  Basic applied research process (Sekaran, 1992) 
 
3.4 – Data Collection 
 
3.4.1 – Web CMI 
 All data were acquired through the USACE WebCMI on-line application.  This tool is 
made available to USACE customers to monitor the status of their respective construction 
projects.  The application incorporates data from multiple databases and information systems 
to provide the customer with up-to-date project status.  Some of the systems which feed the 
WebCMI application are: 
• Resident Management System (RMS) provides construction phase information. 
• Program and Project Management Business Process (P2) provides basic project 
definition information. 
• Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS) provides current 
financial project data. 
 The information contained in the WebCMI is hierarchical and able to be sorted.  
Therefore, to obtain the data for this study, a query of projects in each USACE District was 
conducted.  Projects were categorized as civil works, environmental, or military construction 
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within the WebCMI application.  In order to achieve a homogenous data set of building 
projects, the search for project information was limited to military construction projects.    
 Within the military construction project category were multiple types of projects funded 
with differing types of federal funds.  For example some projects were locally funded with 
operations and maintenance dollars while others used multi-year military construction funds.  
To obtain the desired homogenous data set of building projects, only projects funded with 
military construction funds and governed by the requirements of AR 415-15 were selected.  
Therefore, projects were limited to the following fund types: 
• Military Construction, Army (MCA) 
• Minor Military Construction, Army (MMCA) 
• Military Construction, Army Reserve (MCAR) 
• Military Construction, Army National Guard (MCNG) 
• Military Construction, Air Force (MCAF) 
• Minor Military Construction, Air Force (MMAF) 
• Military Construction, Air Force Reserve (MAFR) 
• Department of Defense, Medical (DODM) 
 Once the WebCMI projects had been sorted by fund type, only completed projects with 
construction performance information were selected.  Therefore, only those projects that had 
RMS information and an actual construction completion date were selected.  In this manner, 
100% of all completed projects in the WebCMI application were obtained in the initial data 
set.  It should be noted that projects are constantly being added to and deleted from the 
WebCMI application, therefore the makeup of the data set will change with time.  However, 
if the data set is sufficiently large and representative of the population the results of the 
analysis should be reproducible, regardless of when the data set was acquired. 
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3.4.2 – Data Selection / Screening Criteria 
      The initial MILCON data set represents 100% of the completed military projects in the 
WebCMI database during the sampling time, from June to November 2006.  This initial data 
set included 400 project entries from 22 Districts.  Therefore, successive screening criteria 
were used in an effort to reduce measurement error.  
 
3.4.2.1 – Screening for Duplicate Contract Numbers 
      The first screening criterion was to eliminate duplicate projects based on their contract 
number.  A contract number is a comprised of 13 alphanumeric characters.  The first six 
characters identify the contracting agency and or service component (i.e. Army, Air Force, 
etc).  The seventh and eighth characters specify the fiscal year that the contract was awarded.  
The ninth character identifies the type of contract (construction, delivery order, etc.)  The 
tenth through thirteenth characters serve as a unique serial number for the contract.   
      It is possible for contract numbers with the alphanumeric designator “D” as the ninth 
character to have multiple awards as this is a delivery order contract.  However, based on 
how the WebCMI system handled change order and schedule tracking duplicate contract 
numbers with the ninth character as anything other than “D” were not allowed.  For instance, 
in WebCMI a delivery order contract will track the changes and schedule as a function of the 
delivery order keeping this information specific to each delivery order.  However, for a 
construction contract the change and schedule information are tracked as a function of the 
contract number.  Therefore, if the same contract number was assigned to two separate 
projects in WebCMI any change and schedule data cannot reliably be attributed to the correct 
project.       
      Duplicate construction contract numbers may also exist for projects that had phased 
funding.  Normally, the subsequent phases for the project will not contain a contract award 
amount; rather they were handled as options to the original contract.  Therefore, these 
duplicate entries could be summed to get the entire project record and the subsequent phase 
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entries were removed from the data set.  However, if the subsequent phase was handled as a 
change order then the entries were removed from the data set because this would adversely 
skew the performance metrics concerning cost.  Similarly, if the duplicate construction 
contract entries were for the same project but contained different schedule information then 
the entries were removed from the data set.  Finally, if two entries had duplicate construction 
contract numbers but it could not be determined how the entries related to one another then 
both entries were removed from the data set. 
      The application of this screening criterion resulted in 30 projects being removed from 
the data set. 
 
3.4.2.2 – Screening by Contract Award Type 
      The Federal Business Opportunities (FBO) on-line database was used to validate the 
project delivery method as traditional or design-build.  It was found that some multiple award 
task order contract (MATOC) awards were for “Construction and Design-Build 
Construction” services.  It was not possible to differentiate which delivery/task orders for the 
MATOC contract were for construction services and which were for design-build services.  
Therefore, the five projects with an FBO award of this category was removed from the data 
set. 
 
3.4.2.3 – Screening by “Design-by” Data 
      The categorization of the project delivery method into either “Traditional” or “Design-
Build” was based in large part on the “Design-by” data.  Therefore, the 11 projects that had 
no “Design-by” data were removed from the data set since this would adversely affect the 
ability to properly categorize the project’s acquisition method. 
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3.4.2.4 – Accuracy of Categorization of Acquisition Method      
 Projects were categorized as design-build or traditional, design-bid-build based on the 
“Design-by” data field, the project description data field, authorized phase data field, and the 
synopsis data field (if used).  For example, the design-by data field may indicate that the 
project was designed by an architectural engineer, yet the authorized phase may indicate a 
code 7 (authorization for design-build procurement).  An authorized phase identified as a 
code 9 would indicate final design authorization and a traditional, design-bid-build project 
delivery method.  (AR 415-15, 1998)  Similarly, the project description may include the 
phrase “design and construct” indicating that the design build project delivery method was 
used or the project synopsis field may name a design-build firm.  It is possible to have a 
conflict between data fields, especially if they are drawn into the WebCMI application from 
different stand-alone applications.  Therefore, if any of the four elements indicated design-
build had been utilized then the project was categorized as design-build.   
 To determine the accuracy of this assignment methodology each project was queried 
against the FBO on-line database to determine the project delivery method for each project.  
Unfortunately, the FBO on-line database did not contain records on 100% of the projects 
extracted from the WebCMI application.  The most notable variance between the two 
databases was regarding projects executed outside of the continental United States 
(OCONUS).  There were other variances and may be a factor of project size and whether 
alternative public notice was issued for the solicitation.  Therefore, for each “Design-by” 
category those projects with a corresponding record in the FBO database were selected to 
determine the accuracy of the assignment methodology.  If less than 10% of the entries were 
misclassified then the assignment methodology was deemed adequate and all projects of that 
“Design-by” code would be included in the final data set.  If greater than 10% of the entries 
were misclassified then only those projects listed in the FBO database were included and the 
project delivery method on the misclassified projects were corrected. 
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 The first category to be evaluated was projects designed by an A/E which used a 
construction-type contract (instead of a delivery order contract).  There were a total number 
of 91 projects with a “designed by” code of A/E.  However, only 63 had a corresponding 
record in the FBO online database.  Of the 63 projects confirmed in the FBO database, seven 
were misclassified, which equals 11.1% of the projects.  Accordingly, all 91 projects 
designed by an A/E without a corresponding record in the FBO online database were purged 
from the data set.   
 The next category to be evaluated was projects designed by an A/E which used a 
delivery order-type contract.  There were a total number of 12 projects meeting these criteria 
with a corresponding record in the FBO online database.  Of these projects, eight were 
misclassified which correlates to 66% of the projects.  All 17 projects designed by an A/E 
executed on a delivery order contract without an FBO record were removed from the data set. 
 The results of the misclassification by project type are shown in Table 5.  Checking the 
accuracy of the classification of project delivery method resulted in 170 projects being 
removed from the data set.  However, the project delivery method classification of the 
remaining data set is extremely accurate.  
 
3.4.2.5 – Screening for Vertical Construction Projects 
 In order to determine whether the project delivery method will have a potential impact on 
Med-MILCON projects the data was restricted to projects with a vertical construction 
component.  Therefore, projects that were airfield paving, security fencing, flood control, 
utility infrastructure, and water treatment systems were removed from the data set.  Similarly, 
projects with small a small vertical footprint relative to the scope of the project were 
removed due to the likelihood that they could skew results regarding unit cost calculations.  
An example of this type of facility is a marksmanship range where a substantial amount of 
the work is associated with grading, clearing and utilities and results in a facility of just over 
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Table 5.  Project delivery method classification accuracy. 
“Design by” 
Code 
Contract Type # of 
Projects
# of Projects 
with FBO 
confirmation
# of Projects 
Misclassified 
Rate # of 
Projects 
Removed
Construction 91 63 7 11.1% 91 AE: 
Architect-
Engineer 
Delivery 
Order 
17 12 6 66.7% 17 
Construction  27 0 - - DC: 
Design-
Construct 
Delivery 
Order 
 5 0 - - 
Construction 30 29 5 17.2% 30 HL: Hired 
Labor Delivery 
Order 
12 4 2 50.0% 12 
Construction 20 2 1 50.0% 20 ID: Indirect 
Design Delivery 
Order 
1 0 0 - 1 
Construction  0 0 - - US: Using 
Service Delivery 
Order 
 2 2 100.0% 0 
 
100 square feet.  Application of this screening criterion resulted in 33 projects being removed 
from the final data set. 
 
3.4.2.6 – Screening for Pending Changes or Unfunded Changes 
 In the Resident Management System (RMS) data fields it is possible to determine 
whether a project record had pending, approved changes.  Such a balance may indicate that 
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while the construction activities on a project are complete it has not been financially closed 
out.  As the project moves toward financial closure this pending balance may affect the 
financial performance of the project. 
 Likewise, the RMS data fields make it possible to determine whether a project has 
unfunded changes.  The resolution of this type of change may take a substantial amount of 
time if litigation is required and may adversely impact the financial performance of the 
project. 
 For these reasons any project with a balance shown as a pending, approved change or 
an unfunded change were removed from the final data set.  The application of this screening 
criterion resulted in the removal of data for 29 projects. 
 
3.4.2.7 – Impact of Screening Criteria on Final Data Set 
 The application of the screening criteria outlined above resulted in a smaller, more 
reliable data set than was initially extracted from the WebCMI application.  The impact of 
the screening criteria on the data set is shown in Table 6, below. 
 The final data set used in all subsequent analysis was comprised of 119 projects.  Of 
which, 63% were design-build and 37% were design-bid-build.  The applied screening 
criteria affected the North Atlantic Division the greatest with 88.1% of the original projects 
being screened out of the final data set.  At the other extreme is the South Pacific Division 
which only experienced a screening rate of 60.5%. 
 
3.4.3 – Data Correction 
 Project data requires correction for project location, size, and time-value-of-money.  
These adjustments are routine for construction projects and are outlined in RS Means 
manuals.  However, since these projects are exclusively military it was desired to use military 
adjustment factors as outlined in Army policy.  (Programming, 1994) 
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Table 6.  Summary of the impact on the data set by application of screening criteria. 
 
 
3.4.3.1 – Project Size Adjustment 
 A larger project may allow a contractor to gain an economy of scale advantage and 
therefore construct the larger facility at a reduced unit cost.  Recognizing this fact the 
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USACE has a reference facility size for each type of facility.  By comparing the project 
facility size to the reference facility size a size relationship ratio is determined. (Unit, 2006)  
The size relationship ratio is calculated using the following formula: 
 
SizeFacilityference
SizeBuildingojectRatiolationshipSize
Re
PrRe =  
  
 The calculated size relationship ratio used to determine the correct size adjustment 
factor using a lookup table in Appendix A, Unit Costs for Army Facilities – Military 
Construction. (Unit, 2006)  The smallest facilities, as defined by a size relationship ratio 
<0.05, receive the maximum size adjustment factor of 1.275.  The largest facilities, as 
defined by a size relationship ratio of >3.05, receive the minimum size adjustment factor of 
0.920.   
 This procedure is used on all facility types except for military family housing and 
barracks/dormitories.  For these facility types the size adjustment factor is based off of the 
number of family housing units in the project or the number of soldiers to be housed.  The 
size adjustment factors are distributed over a similar range as outlined above. 
 It was necessary adjust the actual project cost data elements to eliminate any potential 
effects based on project size by dividing the actual project cost data element by the size 
adjustment factor.  Therefore, the costs for small projects, having a size adjustment ratio <1, 
will be decreased in order to remove the size “penalty.”  Likewise, the costs for large 
projects, having a size adjustment ratio >1, will be increased in order to remove the size 
“advantage.”  This results in a data set in which projects may be directly compared regardless 
of project size.  
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3.4.3.2 – Project Location Adjustment 
 The USACE multiplies estimated project costs by an area cost factor (ACF) in order to 
determine an equivalent local value as part of the programming process.  The national 
average cost factor is assumed to be 1.00, determined from 96 Base Cities (two cities per 
state in the Continental United States).  The ACF index is developed based on the local 
construction costs for a market basket of 8 labor crafts, 17 construction materials, 4 
equipment items, and seven other matrix factors that reflect local conditions affecting 
construction costs, such as weather, climatic (frost zone, wind load), seismic, contractor 
overhead and profit, life support and mobilization, labor availability and labor productivity 
compared to the U.S. standard.  This market survey is updated biannually.  (DoD, 2006) 
 Therefore, to convert the project financial information into a national average cost the 
following formula was used: 
FactorCostArea
CostGivenCostAverageNational =  
By converting all projects to an equivalent national average value it is possible to directly 
compare projects from differing regions. 
 
 3.4.3.3 – Project Time Adjustment 
 All raw data values are expressed in what are termed current dollars which is value of 
goods and services in terms of the prices and estimated inflation at the time of purchase.  The 
use of current dollars distorts time-series analysis by failing to reflect the greater purchasing 
power of the dollar in earlier years or the declining purchase power in later years. 
 Constant dollars are uninflated dollars, which measure the value of purchased goods 
and services in terms of the price level in a given base year.  All cost data from fiscal years 
prior the base year are inflated to be equal to an equivalent amount in base year dollars; all 
fiscal years following the base year are deflated so that the amounts are equivalent base year 
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dollars.  The same dollar amount is used when both the current and constant values are in the 
same base year. (Inflation, 2002) 
 A composite inflation index is a multiplication factor for compounding inflation and is 
used for converting base year constant/current dollars to current/constant dollars in another 
year.  The inflation rates used in preparation of the Army's budget are based on economic 
assumptions provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  The rates are 
published in February in Table S-4 Comparison of Economic Assumptions in the Budget of 
the United States.   
 Therefore, all actual project cost data was converted into FY07 constant dollars using 
the appropriate military construction inflation index. (Inflation, 2002)  This will allow for 
direct comparison of project cost data regardless of project completion date. 
 
3.5 – Data Demographics and Internal Validation 
 The findings of this study are only as reliable as the data on which it is founded.  
Through the application of stringent screening criteria and utilization of a second, 
independent project database it was believed that the data set would be fairly uniform and 
representative of the population as a whole. 
 Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate the time variability of the WebCMI data set.  Due to the 
length of construction and settlement of claims it appears that the longer it has been contract 
award the greater the probability that the project will pass the established screening criteria, 
regardless of project delivery method.  However, the sudden decrease in the number of 
projects from 2002 to 2001 demonstrate that after a period of time projects are closed out and 
removed from the WebCMI application.  Therefore, to obtain a better picture of the 
performance of projects executed by the USACE this study would need to be replicated over 
successive years to fill in the “gaps” in the FY 2003, 2004, and 2005 data. 
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Figure 4.  Number of projects by year by project delivery method. 
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Figure 5.  Contract award amount by year by project delivery method. 
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Figure 6. Design-build projects as a percentage of total projects by year. 
 
  Taking into account the variability of the number of projects by time and neglecting 
years 2005 and 2001, Figure 6 shows a fairly steady percentage of USACE projects being 
awarded design-build.  This percentage fluctuates between 59 and 67% and was surprising 
based on this researcher’s experience with Med-MILCON projects.   In fact, it would appear 
that the USACE is well on the way to making design-build the rule, rather than the exception 
for project delivery. 
 The definition of project size in this study was based on earlier design-build research 
focusing on transportation projects and is based on the value of the contract or project. 
(Shane, 2003) From figures 7 and 8 it is evident that the projects comprising this study were 
relatively small, as no projects were recorded in the Large or Mega sizes.  However, based on 
upcoming medical construction projects these size classifications are as applicable to facility 
construction as they are transportation projects. 
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Figure 7.  Distribution of projects by size by project delivery method. 
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Figure 8. Distribution of project size as a percentage of total award value. 
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3.6 - Analysis 
 
3.6.1 – Performance Metrics 
 The preliminary steps of the research methodology outlined in Figure 3 have been 
discussed above.  Therefore, the analysis method must now be addressed. Typical project 
performance is assessed based on the concepts of time, cost, and quality.  The construction 
industry has traditionally used measures of change from the original contract time and cost as 
cardinal performance metrics.  However literature has revealed that some of the most 
common metrics are not as valuable in measuring actual construction performance as 
previously thought.  Performance metrics are broken down into three types: relative, static, 
and dynamic. (Gransberg, 2002) 
 
3.6.1.1 – Relative Metrics 
 Relative metrics are independent of project size, which allows for direct comparison of 
small and large project performance.  (Gransberg, 2002)  Examples of relative metrics 
include cost, schedule and award growth. 
 
Cost Growth 
 Literature is rife with the use of cost growth as a metric to evaluate construction project 
performance. (Jahren, 1991; Konchar, 1998; Gransberg, 2002; Ling, 2004; El Wardani, 
2005)  The generally accepted formula for calculating cost growth is expressed as: 
 
( ) 100Pr ⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
CostContract
CostContractCostojectFinalGrowthCost  
Where: 
      Cost Growth (%) 
      Final Project Cost ($) 
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      Contract Cost ($) 
 
Schedule Growth 
 Like cost growth, the schedule growth metric is widely utilized to assess construction 
project performance. (Konchar, 1998; Gransberg, 2002; Ling, 2004; El Wardani, 2005) The 
generally accepted formula for calculating schedule growth is expressed as: 
 
( ) 100⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
TimePlannedAsTotal
TimePlannedAsTotalTimeTotalGrowthSchedule  
Where: 
      Schedule Growth (%) 
      Total Time (months or calendar days) 
      Total As Planned Time (months or calendar days) 
 
Award Growth 
 The final relative metric is award growth and is an assessment of how the difference 
between the contract award amount and engineer’s estimate. (Gransberg, 2002)  Award 
growth may also be a reflection of the bidding environment at the time of solicitation.  The 
formula for this metric is expressed as: 
 
( ) 100
'
' ⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
EstimatesEngineer
EstimatesEngineerCostContractOriginalGrowthAward  
Where: 
      Award Growth (%) 
      Original Contract Cost ($) 
      Engineer's Estimate ($) 
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3.6.1.2 – Static Metrics 
 Static metrics are discreet numerical measures that do not change with time. 
However, these metrics are size dependent and can only be used when comparing projects 
that are roughly the same size. (Gransberg, 2002)  Examples of static metrics include design 
unit cost, construction unit cost, and design-build unit cost. 
 A direct comparison of design build unit cost and construction unit cost within this 
study may be misleading as the construction unit cost does not reflect a design burden.  It 
must be noted that there is a design burden associated with traditional, design-bid-build 
projects that is not reflected in the standard metrics. 
 
Design Unit Cost (Gransberg, 2002) 
 Design unit cost determines the average design cost per square-foot of constructed area 
and may be expressed by the following formula: 
 
Size
CostDesignCostDesignUnit =  
Where: 
      Design Unit Cost ($/SF) 
      Design Cost ($) 
      Size (SF) 
 
Construction Unit Cost (Gransberg, 2002) 
 Construction unit cost determines the average cost per square-foot of constructed area 
and is expressed by the following formula: 
Size
CostnContructioFinalCostUnitonConstructi =  
Where: 
      Construction Unit Cost ($/SF) 
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      Final Construction Cost ($) 
      Size (SF) 
 
Design-Build Unit Cost (Gransberg, 2002) 
 Design-build unit cost determines the average cost per square-foot of constructed area 
and is expressed by the following formula: 
Size
CostBuildDesignCostUnitBuildDesign =  
Where: 
      Design Build Unit Cost ($/SF) 
      Design Build Cost ($) 
      Size (SF) 
 
3.6.1.3 – Dynamic Metrics 
 Dynamic metrics vary with time and these measures are also dependent on project size. 
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Design Placement (Gransberg, 2002) 
 Design placement is the average cost per day of a design contract and is expressed by 
the following formula: 
TimeContractDesign
CostContractDesignPlacementDesign =  
  Where: 
      Design Placement ($/day) 
      Design Contract Cost ($) 
      Design Contract Time (days) 
 
Construction Placement (Gransberg, 2002) 
 Effective and efficient construction management is obtained when high values of 
construction placement are achieved.  Construction placement is expressed by the following 
formula: 
TimeonConstructiFinal
CostonConstructiFinalPlacementonConstructi =  
  Where: 
      Construction Placement ($/day) 
      Final Construction Cost ($) 
      Final Construction Time (days) 
 
Design-Build Placement (Gransberg, 2002) 
 
TimeBuildDesign
CostBuildDesignPlacementBuildDesign =  
  Where: 
      Design Build Placement ($/days) 
      Design Build Cost ($) 
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      Design Build Time (days) 
 
Construction Intensity (Gransberg, 2002) 
 
TimeonConstructiFinal
Size
CostonConstructiFinal
Intensity
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
=  
  Where: 
      Intensity ($/SF/day) 
      Final Construction Cost ($) 
      Size (SF) 
      Final Construction Time (days) 
 
3.6.1.4 – Additional Metrics 
 Additional performance metrics and/or project characteristics were calculated from the 
MILCON project data.  The metric/characteristics and the corresponding formula are listed in 
Appendix A. 
 
3.6.1.5 - Analysis 
 To test the validity of the hypotheses proposed in chapter 2, a two-tail Student’s t-test 
was performed using the analysis tool pack in Microsoft Excel.  This software analysis 
method was chosen over other potential software packages due to the learning curve and the 
availability of this software on other government computer systems in the future.  If this 
study is to be updated in the future it is better to use software already in use and understood 
by the intended audience.  Furthermore, the Student’s t-test used in this study assumed two 
samples of unequal variance and significance (α) of 0.05, corresponding to a 95% confidence 
level. 
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 The two-tail Student’s t-test function performs a comparison of means and returns the 
probability whether two samples are likely to have come from the same population.  If the 
probability value was greater than a pre-established threshold then the result was interpreted 
that the two samples are likely to have come from the same population and no statistical 
significance existed.  For this study, if the probability was less than 15% then the difference 
between the two samples was interpreted as being statistically significant and this value also 
serves as the threshold for Type I errors using the Student’s t-test  The 15% threshold value 
was selected based on the initial, exploratory nature of this study.  In order to gain the widest 
perspective of potential differences between project delivery methods, it was deemed that the 
significance threshold had to be expanded to the 15% level.  Future research may necessitate 
narrowing of this significance threshold to either 5 or 10% due to the more focused scope of 
that work. 
 Another analysis tool used in this study was the relative value matrix.  Typically used 
to support decision papers or briefings in military operations the relative value matrix is 
applied to focus the subsequent analysis.  For the 23 characteristics assessed using the 
Student’s t-test a relative value was assigned to each characteristic based on the performance 
relative to the traditional project delivery method.  For example, if the design-build 
characteristic was better than design-bid-build the relative value was “1.”  If the design-build 
characteristic was worse than the traditional project delivery method the relative value was “-
1.”  Finally, if there was no statistical difference between the two project delivery methods or 
if the characteristic is only descriptive in nature the relative value was “0.”  An example of a 
descriptive characteristic is the adjusted contract award amount, which simply describes the 
monetary value of the project and not how that project performed. 
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Figure 9.  Research model showing interactions between data and research questions. 
  
 The final analysis tool used was an analysis of variance (ANOVA), which is an 
approach to determine if there is a significant difference between numerous groups.  As with 
the Student’s t-Test, the ANOVA analysis was conducted using the analysis tool pack in 
Microsoft Excel.  This analysis was a single factor ANOVA test with alpha values (α) of 0.5 
and 0.10.  The null hypothesis to be tested with this type of test is that the population means 
are equal, or there is no difference between populations.  However, if the probability, or P-
value, returned by the ANOVA test is less than the alpha value used in the test the difference 
between groups is considered statistically significant.  Likewise, if the F-value returned by 
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the ANOVA test is greater than the F-critical value then the difference between groups is 
considered statistically significant. (Newbold, 2007)  In general, the ANOVA tests the 
following hypotheses:  
xoH ημμμ ==== ...: 321  
jikH μμ ≠:  For at least one pair μi, μj. 
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CHAPTER 4 – DATA ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 – Introduction 
 The nature of the military construction system is that total construction needs exceed 
the available funds and political influences affect the mix of projects.  In the case of this 
study, the data set contains an abundance of projects of one particular type and a dearth of 
other types.  This results in limited conclusions that may be drawn from this data set and 
trends can only be identified from the available information.  These problems are noted 
where applicable in the following sections.  
 Factors to consider when analyzing the data include the budgetary restrictions.  Military 
construction funds can only be used to fund military construction and funds left over at the 
end of a project may be held in reserve for pending claims, be used to fund other projects at 
financial risk, or allowed to expire in order to return the funds to the Treasury.  Therefore, 
there is a “use it or lose it” mentality tied with federal appropriations.  Due to the substantial 
time period from project need identification/programming to construction award, there is a 
philosophy among users that this is their only chance to “leave their mark” on the facility. 
 
4.2 – Data Analysis 
  As discussed in chapter 3, the data will be analyzed primarily through the use of a 
Student’s t-test.  This requires the segregation of the sample into two populations so that they 
may be compared.  The hypotheses in chapter 2 focused this study to determine what 
differences, if any, existed between design-build and design-bid-build projects executed by 
the USACE.  Therefore, all t-tests were performed comparing the design-build population to 
the design-bid-build population. In the limited cases where an ANOVA test was utilized the 
samples were segregated differently and will be discussed in more detail in these instances. 
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4.2.1 – Time 
 The data set was stratified based on project delivery method and an aggregate 
comparison of design-build performance to design-bid-build performance was made using a 
t-test.  The results of this test are shown in Table B-1; however the pertinent information 
related to project time has been extracted and is shown in Table 7.  This analysis tested the 
following hypotheses: 
buildbiddesignbuilddesignH −−− = μμ:0  
buildbiddesignbuilddesignH −−− ≠ μμ:1  
 
Table 7. T-test summary regarding contract time. 
Characteristic 
Total  
Sample 
Mean 
Design-
Build 
Mean 
(75 Projects) 
Design-Bid-
Build 
Mean 
(44 Projects) Probability 
Controllable Change 
Duration 
(days) 48.19       
Controllable Change 
Duration Ratio 0.34       
Contract Schedule 
Growth 
(%)   128.49 110.41 0.14233 
BOD Time Growth 
(days)   87.68 41.66 0.11539 
BOD Growth 
(%)   11.80 6.04 0.13601 
Contract Time Growth 
(%) 31.19       
BOD to Completion 
Duration 
(days) 10.21       
  
 Table 7 shows that there were no significant differences between the project delivery 
methods regarding the controllable change duration and the ratio of the value of controllable 
changes compared to the total value of changes.  There were, on the average, 48 days in 
approved change orders directly attributable to controllable changes for both project delivery 
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methods.  Schedule growth can come from one of two sources, durations attributed to 
controllable changes and durations attributed to uncontrollable changes.  Since the 
controllable change durations are, on the average, equivalent any difference in schedule 
growth between the project delivery methods is assumed to arise from the uncontrollable 
changes. 
 Near the sensitivity threshold of 15% there is a difference in the contract schedule 
growth between design-build projects and design-bid-build projects.  This finding coupled 
with the finding that controllable changes are equivalent regardless of project delivery 
method would seem to indicate that the MILCON design-build projects experience greater 
uncontrollable cost growth, presumably from user-requested changes.   
 The contract schedule growth metric is explained in detail in Appendix A, however it is 
sensitive to changes in the beneficial occupancy date (BOD).  Therefore, the statistically, 
significant difference in BOD growth between project delivery methods carries over into the 
contract schedule growth metric.  Leading to the question of why the BOD increased more 
for design-build projects than design-bid-build projects? 
 It was initially thought that the difference in the beneficial occupancy increases was 
based on the fact that the design-build project had to complete its design in the contract 
performance period, whereas the design-bid-build project did not.  However, there is a 
conflicting result with this assumption. 
 The contract time growth is statistically the same between the project delivery methods, 
and its exact explanation may be found in Appendix A.  This metric is calculated based on 
the actual performance duration and the initial contract duration and the beneficial occupancy 
date is irrelevant.  This finding indicates that based on contract performance period the 
design-build project delivery method is at least as good as the design-bid-build method. 
 The result indicating that contract schedule growth for design-build projects was 
significantly greater may in fact be a symptom of the flexibility of the BOD.  If a facility is 
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needed immediately then BOD may be accelerated to the point where early occupancy is 
provided to the user.  Similarly, BOD may coincide with the project completion or may occur 
shortly afterward.  Based on this logic then a project’s contract time growth is the better 
metric to gauge performance. 
 In summary it appears that based on this analysis that the design-build project delivery 
model performs as well as design-bid-build project delivery model regarding the contract 
performance periods.  This test supports the null hypothesis that the contract time 
performance of design-build projects is equal to the contract time performance of design-
build projects.  However, this result should not be construed to mean that a design-build 
project delivery method takes as long to produce a facility as the design-bid-build method.  
The design period for MILCON design-bid-build projects will take from one to two years as 
discussed earlier.  The design period is included in the contract performance period of a 
design-build project, meaning that if similar projects were timed from a common point of 
reference then the design-build project would be delivered faster on the average.   
 
4.2.2 – Cost 
 The data set was stratified based on project delivery method and an aggregate 
comparison of design-build performance to design-bid-build performance was made using a 
t-test.  The results of this test are shown in Table B-1; however the pertinent information 
related to project cost has been extracted and is shown in Table 8.  This analysis tested the 
following hypotheses: 
buildbiddesignbuilddesignH −−− = μμ:0  
buildbiddesignbuilddesignH −−− ≠ μμ:2  
 From Table 8 it is shown that, on the average, contract award amounts for design-build 
projects do not significantly differ from the contract award amounts of design-bid-build 
projects.  Similarly, the project award amounts, which attempt to adjust the design-bid-build 
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contract costs to include estimated design costs, did not significantly differ between the two 
project delivery populations.  This was expected due to the relatively large distribution of 
contract award amounts. 
 
Table 8. T-test summary regarding project cost. 
Characteristic 
Total  
Sample  
Mean 
Design-Build
Mean 
(75 Projects) 
Design-Bid-
Build 
Mean 
(44 Projects) Probability 
Adjusted Contract 
Award Amount 
(Constant FY07 $) 9,594,091.83       
Adjusted Initial Project 
Amount 
(Constant FY07 $) 9,774,708.78       
Adjusted Final Contract 
Amount 
(Constant FY07 $) 10,371,140.55       
Adjusted Final Project 
Amount 
(Constant FY07 $) 10,551,757.50       
Contract Cost Growth 
(%) 6.31       
Project Cost Growth 
(%) 6.15       
Award Growth 
(%) 0.65       
Unit Cost 
($/sf) 264.33       
Project Placement 
($/day)   15,007.29 9,887.68 0.03149
Contract Intensity 
($/sf/day)  0.39 0.50 0.13856
Project Intensity 
($/sf/day)   0.39 0.27 0.00500
 
 All of the various performance metrics for contract cost growth and project cost growth 
were not found to significantly differ between the two project delivery populations.  Detailed 
descriptions of these metrics may be found in Appendix A. 
 Table 8 also reveals a statistically significant difference between the design-build and 
design-bid-build project delivery methods regarding project placement.  According to the 
70 
literature a larger project placement value is indicative of effective and efficient construction 
management. (Gransberg, 2002)  From this test it appears that the design-build project 
delivery method provides the owner with a more efficient and effective construction 
management organization.  Due to the team-based delivery and the single point of 
responsibility feature of the design-build project delivery method this finding is to be 
expected and is of a benefit to owners. 
 The results shown for final two characteristics shown in Table 8 are of questionable 
value.  Due to the lack of size data for all projects, any metric that required the project size as 
part of the calculation is not necessarily representative of the population.  The size data 
element was not as robust as other data elements used in this study.  
 In summary, contract cost performance did not significantly differ between the project 
delivery methods substantiating the null hypothesis.  However, the fact that the same 
relationship was seen when estimated design costs were included in design-bid-build projects 
indicates that as a project delivery method, design-build may be cheaper.   
 For example, if the design-build project delivery method were used on all Med-
MILCON projects there would be a potential net savings equivalent to the planning and 
design (P&D) funds allocated to traditional Med-MILCON projects.  This “savings” is 
assumed at 6%, based on statutory limits on design and engineering services.  These funds 
could be cost shifted elsewhere within the USACE, Army, or DoD budgets after appropriate 
reprogramming actions.  However, the same amount of MILCON funds will be required, 
regardless of project delivery method to award the contract.  Design liability would be 
reduced by the very nature of design-build with the single contract for design and 
construction services. 
 Explained another way, the data suggests that if a $100 million dollar facility were 
delivered using the traditional design-bid-build project delivery method and the design-costs 
would be statutorily capped at 6%, or $6 million.  The construction contract would be 
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awarded for $100 million and the total cost to the Government at the time of contract award 
would be $106 million.  However, if the same facility was delivered using the design-build 
project delivery method then the total cost to the Government at the time of contract award 
would simply be $100 million, since the design effort is included in the contract amount.  
Therefore, the design-build project delivery method results in a $6 million or 6% savings 
over traditionally delivered facilities.   
 
4.2.3 – Quality 
 The literature review indicates that public owners are pleased with the quality of 
design-build projects and there are several metrics used to measure the quality of a project.  
However, the quantitative data used in this study could not be used to assess the quality of 
projects, regardless of project delivery method.  A different approach was explored in an 
attempt to acquire qualitative data from which to assess the quality of MILCON projects.  
Many times, a post occupancy evaluation is performed on major Med-MILCON projects 
with the intent of collecting lessons learned from the project delivery process as well as 
assessing the overall quality of the facility.  However, only one post occupancy evaluation 
was located for a design-bid-build project, which is insufficient to address the quality of 
design-build projects compared to design-bid-build projects.  Therefore, this research 
question remains unresolved. 
 
4.2.4 – Facility Type 
 The individual projects were grouped into fourteen separate types based on 
classifications utilized by the Corps of Engineers.  The primary exception to the USACE 
classification system was the separation of aviation maintenance facilities from ground 
maintenance facilities.  The separation of maintenance facilities into these categories was 
justified due to the larger clear span construction methods used in aviation maintenance 
facilities or hangers.  Similarly, the “special” facility type was composed of facilities that did 
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not clearly fit in any of the other facility types, and is composed primarily communication 
facilities of various sizes and capabilities.  The distribution of the various facility types is 
shown in Figures 10 and 11, below. 
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Figure 10.  Distribution of projects by facility type and delivery method. 
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Figure 11.  Distribution of percentage of projects by facility type and delivery method.  
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 The data set was stratified by project delivery method and for each facility type design-
build projects were compared with design-bid-build projects through the use of a Student’s t-
test to test the following hypotheses: 
buildbiddesignbuilddesignH −−− = μμ:0  
buildbiddesignbuilddesignH −−− ≠ μμ:4  
 Of the facility types used in this study only eight were composed of sufficient numbers 
of both design-build and design-bid-build projects to perform a t-test.  As discussed above a 
relative value matrix was prepared and is shown in Table 9, below.   
 Multiple studies have attempted to determine if the design-build project delivery 
method was suitable for all types of projects regardless of size or complexity.  The early 
belief was that design-build was only suitable for small, uncomplicated projects.  However, 
the Federal Construction Council study determined that the design-build project delivery 
method could outperform design-bid-build on all types of projects from simple office 
complexes to complicated industrial and laboratory projects. (Experiences, 1993) 
 The fairly uniform relative value totals shown indicate that the design-build project 
delivery method is able to perform as well as the design-bid-build method on facility types 
included in this study.  This indicates that earlier findings are applicable to military 
construction.  It is notable that the four highest ranked projects are types of facilities with a 
substantial number of repetitive elements, such as exam rooms, classrooms, offices, etc.   
 The barracks and housing facility type had the undisputable best design-build 
performance compared to design-bid-build performance.  The design-build project delivery 
method has been used for this facility type since the first DoD design-build housing projects 
were awarded in 1969.  This result would seem to agree with earlier work that as experience 
levels grow so do the benefits of the design-build project delivery method. 
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Table 9.  Relative value matrix of design-build performance by facility type. 
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4.2.4.1 - Medical Type Facilities 
 This project type was composed of hospital and medical clinic projects and the results 
of the Student’s t-test for this facility type are summarized in Table B-7.  It should be noted 
that each project delivery method sample population was comprised of two projects, which is 
the minimum required to perform a t-test.  If a data element was lacking in one project then a 
t-test could not be performed for that particular characteristic/metric.  There was only one 
metric that proved to be significantly different between design-build and design-bid-build 
medical projects.  Contract time growth for design-build projects was determined to be 
33.5% compared to -3.47% on traditional medial projects.   
 On average medical projects contract duration was determined to be 544 days, and did 
not statistically vary between the two project delivery methods.  As discussed earlier, the 
design time for traditionally delivered medical projects may last up to two years.  Therefore, 
if this two-year design period were factored into the time growth for traditionally delivered 
projects the difference in time growth may not be significant.  It could be argued that while 
the contract time growth was significantly longer for design-build medical projects the 
facility end users still received beneficial occupancy of the facility within a similar duration 
after the completion of project programming. 
 All other performance measures for medical construction projects were not 
significantly different between the two project delivery methods.  It is interesting to note that 
the contract cost and cost growth for design-build medical facilities were nearly equivalent to 
traditionally delivered projects, even with the included design burden.   
 Based on the findings of this study there is a benefit to selecting design-build over 
traditional project delivery methods.  However, due to the marginal size of the existing data 
set further research is recommended.  
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4.2.4.2 - Barracks Type Facilities 
 This type of facility exhibited better performance regarding controllable changes than 
design-bid-build barracks and housing projects.  This category is composed of 
unaccompanied enlisted barracks/dormitories, officer barracks, and family housing projects.   
 On design-build barracks projects the ratio of the value of controllable changes to the 
value of overall changes was significantly lower than traditional barracks projects.  Similarly, 
design-build barracks projects demonstrated a significantly lower value of controllable 
changes without a corresponding decrease in total or controllable change order values.  This 
may be a symptom of the fixed appropriation funding system where the Resident Engineer 
and/or the District Engineer manages a contingency budget and as the likelihood of 
unforeseen changes diminishes increased user-requested changes may be approved.  This 
“use it or lose it” philosophy would effectively change the distribution of change orders from 
unforeseen to user-requested without changing the total value of change orders executed.   
 Therefore, to gain the maximum financial benefit from the design-build project delivery 
method the owner must intensively manage user-requested changes and approve only those 
that are mission critical.  The literature review shows that the Office of Medical 
Transformation is implementing this recommendation for BRAC, medical design-build 
projects. 
 
4.2.4.3 - Training Type Facilities 
 This facility type included training ranges with a vertical construction component, such 
as urban warfare training facilities.  This facility type also included classroom and hands-on 
instructional facilities as well as flight simulation facilities.  Table B-10 demonstrates that 
significant differences between design-build and design-bid-build projects of this facility 
type related to time growth and project placement. 
 From Table B-10 it is shown that regardless of delivery method training type facilities 
experienced contract time growth.  However, the time growth for design-build projects in this 
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facility type was only 13% compared to 46% for traditionally delivered training facilities.  
Likewise, the increased project placement for design-build training projects indicates that the 
more effective and efficient construction management was obtained using the design-build 
project delivery method.  This efficiency and effectiveness may be one of the key reasons 
that the time growth was substantially reduced on design-build training facilities. 
   
4.2.4.4 – Administrative Type Facilities 
 As the name suggests this facility type was composed of administrative structures, 
which are predominantly interchangeable.  Meaning, that a military unit can use the facility 
regardless of that unit’s specialized mission requirements due to the flexibility in the facility 
design.  Table B-13 reveals that administrative design-build projects experienced reduced 
contract time growth and increased placement rates compared with design-bid-build 
administrative projects. 
 The increased placement rates may explain a benefit of the ability of the design-build 
project delivery methodology to successfully leverage the experience of the design-builder.  
The carry-over effect is the reduced contract time growth on design-build projects relative to 
the design-bid-build administrative projects. 
 
4.2.4.5 – Community Type Facilities 
 This facility type includes town halls, libraries, and chapels.  Table B-49 clearly shows 
that the design-build performance regarding controllable change durations trailed design-bid-
build performance for this facility type.  This finding runs contrary to the expectations 
outlined in the literature review as well as the results from this study for the other facility 
types.   
 The fact that there was not a corresponding difference in the value of controllable 
changes or a difference in the ratio of the value of controllable changes to the amount of 
executed changes based on delivery method indicates that time may have been granted on the 
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changes in lieu of money.  This, in turn, may indicate that these projects were funding 
constrained to a greater extent than other facility types. 
 
4.2.4.6 – Hypothesis Testing Results 
 The results of the hypothesis testing between design-build projects and design-bid-build 
projects based on the facility type are summarized in Table 10, below.  From this table it is 
summarized that the design-build project delivery method is at least as good as traditional 
project delivery methods for the majority of facility types.  This finding is in general 
agreement with earlier work performed by the Federal Construction Council regarding 
design-build project performance in the public-sector. 
 The primary benefits of the design-build project delivery method were determined to 
include: 
• Reduced value of controllable changes 
• Reduced contract time growth 
• Reduced planning and design funding 
 It was also noted that in order to capitalize on the reduced value of controllable changes 
associated with the design-build project delivery methodology a stringent user-requested 
change policy must be implemented.  Without this policy the project will be subjected to 
users attempting to “leave their mark” and the “use it or lose it” federal funding philosophy. 
 
4.2.4.7 – ANOVA Test of Design-Build Performance by Facility Type 
 An analysis of variance test was performed on all design-build projects in an effort to 
determine whether the project performance for design-build projects was affected by the type 
of facility being constructed.  The ANOVA analysis tested the following hypotheses: 
trainingcommunitybarracksadoH μμμμ ==== ...: min  
jiH μμ ≠:5  For at least one pair μi, μj. 
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Table 10. Hypothesis test summary between delivery methods based on facility type. 
Facility Type 
Accepted 
Hypothesis 
(H0 or H4) 
Areas of 
Difference 
Administrative H4 Time Growth less on design-build projects Project intensity is greater on design-build projects 
Barracks H4 
Controllable Change Ratio less on design-build projects 
Controllable Change Duration less on design-build projects 
Controllable Change Duration Ration less on design-build 
projects 
Controllable Cost Growth less on design-build projects 
Community H4 
Controllable Change Duration greater on design-build projects 
Controllable Change Duration Ratio greater on design-build 
projects 
Food Service     
Infrastructure     
Maintenance - 
Aviation H0   
Maintenance - 
Ground H0   
Medical H4 Time Growth greater on design-build projects 
Mobility     
Public Safety H0   
Security     
Special     
Storage     
Training H4 Time Growth less on design-build projects Project placement greater on design-build projects 
 
 The results of this analysis are shown in Table B-51.  However, the only metric that 
was determined to significantly differ by facility type (α=0.10) was the award growth, which 
is a measure of the cost escalation between the architect or engineer’s estimate and the 
contract award.  The calculation of this metric requires that the architect or engineer’s 
estimate to be known; which was not the case for the majority of facility types.  Only five 
facility types had at least two projects where the estimated cost was known and these values 
are shown in Table 11.  From that table the Public Safety facility type had only two projects 
with cost estimates and one cost estimate was significantly greater than the other.  This 
affected the average value for that facility type and indicates that the acceptance of 
hypothesis H5 for this metric.  The award growth metric is extremely sensitive to market 
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price fluctuations in materials and/or the quality of the architect/engineer’s estimate.  For 
example, during the time period of this study there was a rapid escalation in steel and 
plywood prices that may have affected the accuracy of the estimated cost. 
  
Table 11.  Award growth values used in ANOVA analysis. 
Award Growth (p = 0.085472) 
(%) 
Public Safety 
(Design-
Build) 
Training 
(Design-Build) 
Maintenance 
- Aviation 
(Design-
Build) 
Administrative
(Design-Build) 
Storage 
(Design-
Build) 
        65.12 
8.41         
    -42.80   -33.61 
  -45.43       
  -20.12 -36.51     
319.59   -45.86 -51.49 14.52 
      -41.15   
    -50.54 170.92   
          
    6.26     
    4.33     
    -22.66     
    -25.69 -30.58   
          
      -27.07   
          
          
          
          
 Award growth has been associated with the probability of project success on Navy 
construction projects falling below the MILCON threshold. (Jahren, 1991)  However, the 
award growth characteristic does not, in and of itself, affect the performance of a 
construction project.  Therefore, if this questionable result is neglected, the ANOVA analysis 
indicates that the design-build project delivery method may be used on the full range of 
facility types contained in this study without significant variation in performance. 
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4.2.5 – Geographical Influence 
 
4.2.5.1 – Major Geographical Region 
 In earlier work performed by the Federal Construction Council it had been attempted to 
determine whether design-build performance differed based on geographic region.  As such 
the United States was divided into four regions.  This study was unable to determine if such a 
relationship existed, because each region in their study was dominated by a different federal 
agency.  Therefore, they were unable to determine if any performance difference arose based 
on geography or if the performance difference was attributed to differing agency policies. 
  
   
 
Figure 12.  Geographic distribution of projects by project delivery method. 
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 Because this study was comprised of data from only one federal agency, the USACE, 
the relationship between design-build performance and geography was explored.  Figure 12, 
shows the geographic distribution of projects by type.  In addition to the four regions used in 
the Federal Construction Council study a fifth region was added to account for work 
occurring outside the continental United States (OCONUS).   
 The data set was stratified by project delivery method and for each region and design-
build projects were compared with design-bid-build projects through the use of a Student’s t-
test to test the following hypotheses: 
buildbiddesignbuilddesignH −−− = μμ:0  
buildbiddesignbuilddesignH −−− ≠ μμ:6  
 Of the five geographic regions it was determined that only three had sufficient 
populations of both design-build and design-bid-build projects to perform a statistical 
analysis using the Student’s t-test.  Interestingly, the two regions with insufficient 
populations were lacking adequate numbers of traditional, design-bid-build projects.  As 
discussed above a relative value matrix was prepared and is shown in Table 12, below.   
 The relative value matrix results are mixed as there is only one characteristic common 
to all three regions.  In all regions the controllable changes on design-build projects 
accounted for a substantially lower portion of the total value of change orders.  The rest of 
the substantial differences between design-build and design-bid-build project delivery 
methods cannot be grouped together reliably.  However, the relative value matrix for the two 
“southern” regions was substantially positive indicating that the design-build project delivery 
method is beneficial.  The northern region’s negative relative value would seem to indicate 
that design-build projects do not out perform similar, design-bid-build projects.  However, 
the lack of a significantly large data set for the northwest region requires further research or 
analysis before any definite conclusions regarding relationships between design-build 
performance and the geographical region may be drawn. 
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Table 12.  Relative value matrix of design-build performance by geographic region. 
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4.2.5.2 – USACE District 
 The seemingly arbitrary nature of the regional boundaries was appropriate for the 
Federal Construction Council study which had a small data set comprised of four clusters.  
Since each district of the USACE has a geographic responsibility and the regions shown in 
Figure 10 do not coincide with these boundaries it was decided that an analysis of design-
build performance by district could help answer two of the research questions.  First, it may 
help to further answer whether there is a regional influence on design-build performance and 
second determine if one district was better at design-build than another district.  
 A relative value matrix was used to assist with deciding if one Corps district was better 
at design-build than another.  Of the 41 geographical districts in the USACE only 17 are 
represented in the data set.  The unrepresented districts may not have a military construction 
mission or their projects were screened out as explained earlier. The data set was stratified by 
project delivery method and for each district and design-build projects were compared with 
design-bid-build projects through the use of a Student’s t-test to test the following 
hypotheses: 
buildbiddesignbuilddesignH −−− = μμ:0  
buildbiddesignbuilddesignH −−− ≠ μμ:7  
 Of the 17 districts in the data set, only seven districts has a large enough population of 
both design-build and design-bid-build projects for analysis using a Student’s t-test. (See 
Tables B-29 through B-42)  As discussed above a relative value matrix was prepared and is 
shown in Table 9, below. 
 At this point it is worthy of mention that of the ten districts with populations too small 
for statistical comparison seven lacked the requisite population of design-bid-build projects.  
This demonstrates, at least anecdotally, that the USACE is moving toward the design-build 
project delivery method as the standard of choice.  
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 The relative value matrix shown in Table 9, below, demonstrates that of the seven 
districts analyzed their application of design-build does not yield standardized project 
performance.  While the project population mix was different for each district, the results of 
the relative value matrix are beyond question.  Those districts with a positive total value were 
ones where the significant advantages of design-build performance outnumbered the 
disadvantages.  The districts with a negative total value were ones where the significant 
disadvantages of design-build performance outnumbered the advantages.  Districts with a 
value of zero exhibited no statistical difference in design-build performance as compared to 
traditional project performance. 
 The use of this relative value matrix is sensitive to the number of occurrences of an 
event.  When two project characteristics portray the same information in two different ways 
the district will be rewarded or penalized for both characteristic.   For example BOD time 
growth expressed as a percentage and BOD time growth expressed as a number of days 
essentially measure the same performance metric two different ways.  While the magnitude 
of the relative value shown in the matrix is sensitive the overall ranking is not.   
 Figures 13 and 14 demonstrate that within each district of the USACE design-build is 
used on different types of projects.  From these figures it is clearly evident that each district 
uses the design-build project delivery method is used on different types of projects. 
 
4.2.5.2.1 – Baltimore District 
 Table 13 has established that using a relative value matrix design-build performance 
lags behind design-bid-build performance in the Baltimore district.  Specifically, change 
order values are significantly greater on design-build projects which results in greater cost 
growth compared with design-bid-build projects.  To put these results into context, the 
design-build performance is based on six projects of five different facility types.  This means 
that the Baltimore district has the third largest number of design-build projects in this 
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Table 13.  Relative value matrix of design-build performance by district. 
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Figure 13.  Design-build facility types by district, 1 of 2. 
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Figure 14.  Design-build facility types by district, 2 of 2 
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Figure 15. Design-build project sizes by district. 
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Figure 16.  Design-build contracting method by district. 
 
analysis.  It was shown earlier that design-build performance does not significantly vary with 
the type of facility.  Figure 15 shows that the majority of the design-build projects awarded in 
the Baltimore district were categorized as “small” with contract award values ranging from 
$2-10 million.  Figure 16 shows that the district’s preferred method of awarding a design-
build project was through the use of MATOC contracts.  
 
4.2.5.2.2 – Los Angeles District 
  The relative value matrix indicates that the performance of design-build projects lag 
significantly behind design-bid-build projects in the Los Angeles district.  The t-test results 
are shown in detail in Table B-41; however, there was a significant difference in contract 
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values by project delivery method.  Larger contracts were awarded using the design-build 
project delivery method with an average value in excess of $9 million compared to less than 
$800,000 for design-bid-build projects.  Therefore, the value of change orders executed on 
the design-build projects was significantly greater which in turn affected the rest of the cost 
growth metrics.  Likewise, since larger projects take longer the same trends were noted for 
schedule growth.  It is likely that the lackluster design-build performance may be an result of 
the difference in average contract values by delivery method. 
 The design-build performance is based on eight projects of six different facility types, 
which gives the Los Angeles district the second largest number of design-build projects in 
this analysis .  Figure 15 demonstrates that the majority of the design-build projects are of a 
small size, ranging from $2-10 million. Figure 16, indicates that all of the design-build 
projects for this awarded through the use of MATOC contracts.   
 
4.2.5.2.3 –Savannah District 
 The relative value matrix indicates that design-build performance in the Savannah 
district is better than the design-bid-build project delivery method.  Specifically, lower values 
of controllable changes were executed with a correspondingly smaller duration associated 
with controllable changes.  Cost growth for design-build projects was, on average, half that 
associated with design-bid-build projects. 
 These performance metrics were calculated from 18 projects of nine facility types.  
According to Figure 15, these projects were predominately medium in size and ranged from 
$10-50 million.  Figure 16, shows that Savannah district awarded these projects through the 
use of single-phase and two-phase solicitations with no MATOC contracts awarded. 
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4.2.5.2.4 – Analysis of Variance for Design-Build Performance by District 
 The overall variation demonstrated in the relative value matrix required the use of an 
ANOVA analysis to determine if design-build performance varied by district.  This analysis 
tested the following hypotheses: 
  SeattleBaltimoreSavannahMobileoH μμμμ ==== ...:  
jiH μμ ≠:8  For at least one pair μi, μj. 
The results of this analysis are shown in Table B-50 and reveal a difference in design-build 
performance regarding contract cost growth, controllable cost growth and award growth 
between districts (when α=0.10).  In the case of contract cost growth it would be assumed 
that the district with the most experience would have the lowest cost growth.  However, that 
finding was not substantiated; rather Seattle district with the fewest design-build projects had 
an almost equivalent contract cost growth rate as Savannah district with the largest number of 
design-build projects.  A detailed review of Table 14 reveals that Louisville district provides 
the best probability of a low cost growth on design-build projects with an average cost 
growth of 2.79% and a variance of only 1.64%.   
 The analysis of controllable cost growth is summarized in Table 15. As with contract 
cost growth, the lowest controllable cost growth values do not seem to correlate to the 
number of completed design-build projects.  In this case, the lowest controllable cost growth 
is achieved by Seattle district with 0.38% and a variance of 0.07%.  However, the Seattle 
district only had two design-build projects in the data set and the fewest of all of the districts 
in the ANOVA analysis. 
 Finally, as discussed earlier the award growth metric is extremely sensitive to material 
price fluctuations and there was limited data regarding the architect/engineer’s estimate 
available to this study.  While the award growth does not, by itself, affect design-build 
performance it has been an indicator of project performance in earlier research. (Jahren, 
1991)  The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 16 and indicate that for the 
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majority of design-build projects a negative award growth is expected.  However, 
Sacramento district experienced a large, positive award growth on one of two total projects.  
This one project affected the average award growth for the district and the ANOVA test 
results. 
  
Table 14.  ANOVA analysis summary for design-build contract cost growth by district. 
Groups Count Sum Average Variance 
Mobile District 
(Design-Build) 4 20.49767 5.124418 3.005793
Savannah District 
(Design-Build) 18 70.12533 3.895851 16.00637
Honolulu District 
(Design-Build) 8 23.44664 2.93083 8.46006
Tulsa District 
(Design-Build) 4 40.45615 10.11404 80.94837
Alaska District 
(Design-Build) 6 47.09531 7.849218 22.30601
Sacramento 
District 
(Design-Build) 4 21.35472 5.33868 19.34145
Baltimore District 
(Design-Build) 6 56.78246 9.463743 45.66126
Louisville District 
(Design-Build) 5 13.96355 2.792711 1.64126
Omaha District 
(Design-Build) 4 17.14025 4.285063 3.086901
Fort Worth District 
(Design-Build) 3 4.388899 1.462966 2.19747
Los Angeles 
District 
(Design-Build) 8 39.57583 4.946979 30.77548
Seattle District 
(Design-Build) 2 7.476206 3.738103 4.198895
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Table 15. ANOVA summary for design-build controllable cost growth by district. 
Groups Count Sum Average Variance 
Mobile District 
(Design-Build) 4 7.01618 1.754045 6.568334
Savannah District 
(Design-Build) 18 22.71185 1.261769 2.250023
Honolulu District 
(Design-Build) 8 12.45397 1.556746 1.790725
Tulsa District 
(Design-Build) 4 21.57797 5.394493 36.43036
Alaska District 
(Design-Build) 6 22.8773 3.812883 29.1971
Sacramento District 
(Design-Build) 4 14.88634 3.721584 28.57569
Baltimore District 
(Design-Build) 6 31.43054 5.238424 23.88338
Louisville District 
(Design-Build) 5 3.742114 0.748423 1.073337
Omaha District 
(Design-Build) 4 6.073067 1.518267 2.139013
Fort Worth District 
(Design-Build) 3 1.521885 0.507295 2.185147
Los Angeles District 
(Design-Build) 8 6.939618 0.867452 1.616646
Seattle District 
(Design-Build) 2 0.751605 0.375802 0.065941
 
Table 16. ANOVA analysis summary for design-build award growth by district. 
Groups Count Sum Average Variance 
Honolulu District 
(Design-Build) 5 -239.718 -47.9437 52.67603
Alaska District 
(Design-Build) 4 -180.521 -45.1302 36.71508
Sacramento District 
(Design-Build) 2 164.05 82.02501 15804.19
Louisville District 
(Design-Build) 3 -55.5679 -18.5226 98.18704
Fort Worth District 
(Design-Build) 3 -10.526 -3.50866 67.90024
Los Angeles District 
(Design-Build) 4 -78.0496 -19.5124 328.6112
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4.2.5.3 – Results 
 From the t-tests, relative value matrix, and ANOVA analysis it is not possible to 
comprehensively determine whether design-build performance varies by geographical region.  
The data set was not large enough to allow for comparison of all major geographical regions.  
When the data set was parsed by the USACE districts, results indicated that in some districts 
the design-build project delivery method outperformed the design-bid-build method.  Other 
districts showed the opposite trend.  It was then shown that design-build project sizes and 
contracting methods differed by district.   
 A district is still composed of multiple installations.  It may still be possible for one 
installation to be very good at design-build and another installation within the same district to 
not be as well versed in the use of design-build.  Any one or all of these unknowns may have 
influenced the analysis of design-build performance by geographical region.  It may prove 
necessary in the future to collect a larger data set and look at design-build performance by 
installation.  It would also be beneficial to determine how design-build performance varies by 
acquisition method and by project size.  Unfortunately, these tests are currently beyond the 
scope of this study. 
 
4.2.6 – Change Orders 
 The data set was stratified based on project delivery method and an aggregate 
comparison of design-build performance to design-bid-build performance was made using a 
t-test.  The results of this test are shown in Table B-1; however the pertinent information 
related to project changes have been extracted and are shown in Table 17  This analysis 
tested the following hypotheses: 
buildbiddesignbuilddesignH −−− = μμ:0  
buildbiddesignbuilddesignH −−− ≠ μμ:9  
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Table 17.  T-test summary regarding project cost. 
Characteristic 
Total 
Sample 
Mean 
Design-Build 
Mean 
(75 Projects) 
Design-Bid-Build 
Mean 
(44 Projects) Probability 
Adjusted Change Order 
Value 
(Constant FY07 $)   474,532.70 1,292,701.01 0.10954
Adjusted Controllable 
Changes  
(Constant FY07 $)   173,377.10 317,942.56 0.12449
Controllable Change 
Ratio   0.42 0.66 0.02036
Controllable Change 
Duration 
(days) 48.19       
Controllable Change 
Duration Ratio 0.34       
Contract Controllable 
Cost Growth 
(%) 2.07       
Project Controllable 
Cost Growth 
(%) 2.03       
 
 The t-test comparison of design-build projects vs. design-bid-build projects reveals 
significant differences related to change orders.  From Table 17, it is noted that on the 
average the value of change orders on design-build projects was dramatically lower 
compared to design-bid-build projects.  While the probability for this t-test was just over 
10%, this finding initially validates other work indicating that the design-build, team based 
project delivery method will reduce change order value. 
 Furthermore, Table 17 indicates that design-build projects experience significantly 
fewer controllable changes compared with design-bid-build projects.  As discussed earlier, 
controllable changes were required/field changes while uncontrollable changes are 
summarized as user-requested changes.  The use of the word “controllable” is related to the 
fact that the contractor (or design-builder) is best able to control the cost and time impact of 
these changes.  Therefore, it appears that the design-build project delivery method will result 
in a lower value of controllable changes than the design-bid-build project delivery method. 
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CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
5.1 – Introduction 
  All construction projects are different with end result of any military construction 
project being influenced by the characteristics of the project, the project delivery team, the 
construction environment, and the political environment.  However, the belief which guided 
this study was that with a sufficiently large and uniform sample population the effects of 
these unquantifiable influences may be mitigated.  Statistical treatment of all data elements 
was not attempted.  For example it may have been possible to look for project performance 
differences by project delivery method by service component (Army vs. Air Force).  It may 
also have been possible to look for performance differences between new construction and 
renewal projects.   
 Based upon the amount of data collected and the results of the analysis performed in 
Chapter 4 additional, similar studies may explore other possible relationships in the future.  
This study did showcase many of the benefits of applying the design-build project delivery 
method to military construction projects. 
 
5.2 – Research Questions 
5.2.1 – Time 
 This study has shown that there design-build MILCON projects may, on the average, 
experience greater contract schedule growth than design-bid-build projects.  It was also 
demonstrated that delays in BOD were greater for design-build projects than design-bid-build 
projects.  However, it must be noted that these differences are marginally significant.  In fact, 
delays in BOD may be affected more by decisions to take early beneficial occupancy for 
select projects.   
 The more important finding was the increased contract schedule growth on design-build 
projects, which initially seems counter to almost all other published research.  However, this 
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is only a measure of the contract performance period increase.  As such this includes the 
design of the facility on design-build projects, which is a separate contract on design-bid-
build projects with its own performance period of 1-2 years.  What remains unanswered is if 
the design of design-bid-build projects was included, which project delivery method will 
complete the facility first?  Due to the limited design data available in the WebCMI 
application this analysis was beyond the scope of this study.  A project delivery time 
comparison, rather than a contract delivery time comparison, is required in future work.  This 
project delivery time will be the contract performance duration for design-build projects and 
the design contract performance duration plus the construction contract performance duration 
for design-bid-build projects.  It is believed that a project delivery time comparison will 
reveal that the design-build project delivery method provides for more rapid facility delivery 
to the customer/end-user. 
 
5.2.2 – Cost 
 This study has demonstrated that among the characteristics related to cost there is not a 
significant difference between project delivery methods.  What was demonstrated was that 
design-build projects, on the average, have more efficient and effective construction 
management. 
 It is important to note that even though there was not a significant difference in the cost 
performance between project delivery methods the design-build method still enjoys a cost 
advantage.  The example used in section 4.3.2 revealed that by avoiding the use of planning 
and design funds on design-build projects, estimated at 6% of the project award amount, 
those funds will be freed up for use elsewhere within the USACE, Army, or DoD.  
Essentially, the design-build project delivery method provides more value for the money with 
the inclusion of design services in the contract award amount. 
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5.2.3 – Quality 
 The quantitative research methodology of this study and the availability of qualitative 
data made determination of project quality variation by delivery method impossible.  A 
separate data set specifically compiled to address quality issues would be required in order to 
answer this research question. 
 
5.2.4 – Facility Type 
 The analysis of design-build performance compared to design-bid-build performance 
by facility type revealed that design-build performed at least as well as design-bid-build.  In 
many cases the design-build project delivery method outperformed the design-bid-build 
method.  As further confirmation, an ANOVA analysis revealed that there was no significant 
variation in design-build performance by facility type. 
 
5.2.5 – Geography 
 This study showed that design-build performance relative to design-bid-build 
performance varied by geographical region as well as USACE district.  Furthermore, design-
build performance varied between USACE districts as well.  It is unfortunate that there is no 
commonality regarding which characteristics varied by geographic location.  It is believed 
that differences in design-build projects, such as size and acquisition method may be 
affecting this variation.  Another possible explanation may lie in the diversity with a district, 
which is comprised of multiple installations.  Since, design-build is predominately a team-
based project delivery method and the team and experience level would vary by installation a 
more apt analysis may be to determine how design-build project performance varies by 
installation.   
 Finally, the investigation of design-build performance variance by geographical region 
may become a moot point.  Under MILCON transformation the USACE is transitioning 
toward centers of expertise for specific facility types.  As this process is completed and 
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lessons learned are centralized by specific facility types there should be reduced variation by 
district by facility type.  What may result instead is variation in design-build performance by 
facility type, which was not observed in the current data set. 
 
5.2.6 – Change Orders 
 The analysis compared all design-build projects to design-bid-build projects and 
differences regarding changes were noted between the two project delivery methods.  First, 
on the average, design-build projects experienced a lower total value of changes orders and a 
lower total value of controllable changes.  The probability for these findings was greater than 
10%, but less than the 15% significance level used in this study.  However, it was also shown 
that design-build projects experienced significantly fewer controllable changes with the 
associated probability of 2%, indicating a strong statistical significance. 
 
5.3 – External Validation of Research Results 
 Scientific and scholarly work must be accurate, verifiable, and reproducible to be of 
value.  In the case of this study, projects are continually being added to and deleted from the 
WebCMI database.  Therefore, it would be expected that the exact value of a metric may 
vary slightly with time and project mix, however the results should remain the same due to 
the size of the data set and the relatively constant relationships of cost and compositions 
shown in Figures 4 and 6. 
 External validation attempts to relate the findings of this study with other, similar 
studies in the design and construction industries.  For example, the Reading University 
design-build study concluded that 75% of design-build projects completed within 5% of 
budget, compared with 63% on traditional projects. (Molenaar, 2003)  This study determined 
that 67% of design-build projects completed within 5% of the initial contract amount, 
compared to 57% for traditional design-bid-build projects.  Therefore, it is concluded that the 
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data set used in this study generally follows trends noted in other works with variations 
arising from the limitation of the data set to military construction projects executed by a 
single organization. 
 Published literature suggested that unforeseen or controllable changes and the overall 
costs of change orders should be lower on design-build projects. (Riley, 2004)  Furthermore, 
other research related to MILCON projects has concluded that the design-build project 
delivery method results in fewer and less costly changes. (Robert A. Perkins, unpublished 
manuscript 2007)  The trends noted in this study validated these findings due to the resulting 
lower value of change orders as well as the reduced value of controllable changes. 
  
5.4 – Research Limitations 
 It needs to be noted that the results of this study are not necessarily applicable to other 
types of projects.  The sample population was limited to only military construction projects 
with a vertical construction component.  These projects were appropriation funded and 
therefore projects that require financing may have different delivery speeds and durations 
based on the availability of funds.   
 The financial performance of traditional, design-bid-build projects may be different 
than shown in this study due to the fact that design costs were assumed to be 6% of the base 
contract award.  It was not possible to collect information on the owner’s administrative 
burden for design-build or design-bid-build projects.  In the future this information may 
become, available if activity based costing (ABC) resource management systems continue 
implementation.   
 The assignment of risk between the owner and the design builder will affect the 
administrative burden of the owner.  The information to include this aspect of administrative 
burden was outside of the scope of this study, however, it may be potentially included in 
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future research on a smaller sample size by careful review of the contract using content 
analysis techniques.   
 Careful application of screening criteria to the data set was meant to ensure a highly 
accurate separation of projects into two sub populations of design-build and traditional, 
design-bid-build.  However, since the WebCMI application is secondary data there is still a 
possibility that projects were misclassified, which can adversely impact the analysis 
contained in this study. 
 The metrics used to evaluate project performance in this study assessed only cost and 
time.  The WebCMI application does not contain any information which may be used to 
assess project quality.  Such information would have to be collected from an alternate source 
using alternative means, such as questionnaires, commissioning reports or post occupancy 
evaluations. 
 
5.5 – Future Research   
 
5.4.1 – Design-Build Project Quality 
 Based on the limits of empirical research and the available data set contained in this 
study the research question the determination of how the project delivery method affects 
project quality was left unanswered.  Future research may be able to better address this 
question by tapping existing conduits for qualitative information. 
 Qualitative data may be included in future research as post occupancy evaluations are 
conducted on major Med-MILCON projects by the USAHFPA.  It is envisioned that the post 
occupancy evaluation process may reveal lessons learned that may be applied to future 
projects.  The existing user satisfaction survey tool, which is completed prior to the post 
occupancy evaluation, may also provide valuable data.  Both the lessons learned and the 
satisfaction survey will allow for quality assessments to be performed through content 
analysis.  Finally, commissioning reports and maintenance data extracted from the Defense 
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Medical Logistics System Standard – Facilities Management (DMLSS-FM) may provide 
valuable empirical data to substantiate subjective quality assessments of completed medical 
construction projects. 
 
5.4.2 – Required Project Performance Levels 
 The USACE currently performs a periodic project status review at the district, division 
and/or program levels.  Each project is compared against a standard metric range and those 
projects falling outside of the range are identified as at-risk.  These at-risk projects require 
detailed explanation in verbal and/or written format during the periodic reviews along with 
potential follow-up actions.  Essentially, this process forces projects to achieve a desired 
performance level.  If this performance level is not set substantially high the process may 
unfortunately encourage projects to achieve mediocrity.  If the level is set too high many 
projects will fail to achieve the standard resulting in an unwieldy review process.   The only 
performance criteria that could be located at the time of  this study related to Air Force 
projects and were know as “Dirtkicker standards.” 
 As discussed earlier the USACE is changing the performance requirements to achieve a 
substantial time and cost benefit across all projects, regardless of service.  Future research 
will have to account for the USACE requisite project performance criteria to determine 
whether the performance objectives have been met.  If the future research is limited to only 
medical projects then a USAHFPA definition for project performance standards may be 
incorporated to judge project performance in lieu of any USACE criteria. 
 
5.4.3 – Contracting Methodology 
 Other studies have divided the project delivery method into sub populations based on 
contract type, which was beyond the capability of this study due to the limited, verifiable 
contract information.  Inclusion of the Standard Form 1442, Solicitation Offer and Award, 
for each project in a future data set as well as the project advertisement will provide more 
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reliable data concerning the acquisition method utilized.  Project acquisition and delivery 
methodology could be analyzed for potential impact on project performance. 
 
5.4.4 – Project Delivery Cost and Time 
 This study focused on military construction funded projects and only approximated 
design costs.  Inclusion of design contract information on design-bid-build projects would 
allow for accurate representation of project delivery time rather than the contract 
performance durations used in this study.  Project–specific activity based costing (ABC) data 
may be included for both delivery methods to better represent total burdened cost of a 
project.  If this information is factored into a future analysis, then the differences between 
project delivery methods may better be determined.  
 Furthermore, in order to assess the shortcomings of the award growth metric a program 
growth metric may be used as was done with the earlier design-build research of NAVFAC 
projects.  By inclusion of the estimated program amount from the Department of Defense 
Form 1391 the future work would not be at the mercy of material cost fluctuations associated 
with the award growth metric.  The regimented process in preparing the DD Form 1391 and 
the program information would allow for a program growth metric to measure the difference 
between the programmed amount and final contract amount.  This program growth metric 
could then be analyzed by project delivery method and used to determine which resulted in 
the least growth.  A similar metric has shown a tie between project success on smaller Navy 
projects. (Jahren, 1991, Mouritsen, 1993)  Because the DD Form 1391 is completed prior to 
the selection of a project delivery method it is will not take into account any perceived 
benefits of any particular delivery method and will serve as a good basis for comparison.   
 However, due to the effort in obtaining and evaluating this cost information, the data 
set in future projects may be greatly reduced when compared with the current study.  This 
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reduction in sample size would be compensated for with improved quality and reliability of 
the data. 
 
5.4.5 – Project Size 
 This study was comprised of projects in the micro to medium size range and therefore 
performance of the design-build project delivery method may only be extrapolated for larger 
projects.  Based on the currently pending Army Transformation and BRAC workload it is 
extremely likely that larger projects will be included in future work, thus improving its 
predictive power.   
 
5.4.6 – Qualitative Data 
 As noted throughout this study a quantitative study can only answer the question of 
how much.  The solution to the question of why can only be inferred.  Therefore, any future 
work must include a method for acquisition an analysis of both quantitative and qualitative 
data.  This may take the form of surveys solicited from Resident Engineers, Health Facility 
Project Officers, or similar project expert and analyzed using content analysis and/or Likert 
scale.  The use of case studies may also be implemented in future work to help answer 
qualitative questions.  Only through a combination of the two methods can we determine 
answers to the pertinent questions of why and by how much. 
 
5.5 – Conclusions 
 
 Based on this study it may be concluded that design-build projects executed by the 
USACE are not meeting the expectations set by published literature.  This does not mean that 
the use of design-build is not advantageous to the federal government, only that there is room 
for improvement in the application.  By its very definition the government enjoys reduced 
liability for design deficiencies on design-build projects.  While there is no statistical 
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difference, on an aggregate basis, between contract cost growth or unit cost, the expense 
associated with planning and design on traditional design-bid-build projects can be cost 
shifted elsewhere by the use of design-build.  Those funds could be reprogrammed for other 
use within the Department of Defense thereby freeing up resources. 
 It will be interesting to note whether the USACE meets their aggressive MILCON 
transformation goals.  Based on the current performance levels it may be possible to achieve 
the 15% cost savings while simultaneously reducing project delivery time by 30%.  While 
this has been achieved on a handful of projects to date, a concerted effort and fundamental 
change in the application of the design-build project delivery method is required.  An initial 
step is in place with the Military Health System – Office of Transformation’s requirement to 
largely eliminate change orders during construction.  The standard RFP process being 
implemented by the USACE on MILCON Transformation projects is another important step.  
By capping the bid amounts and transitioning from prescriptive specifications toward 
performance-oriented specifications improves the likelihood of attaining reduced project 
costs.   
 However, in order to determine the true financial performance difference between 
project delivery methods may require a change in measurement and reporting of fund 
expenditures.  Currently, the planning and design funds are handled separate from the 
MILCON funds for construction of traditional, design-bid-build projects.  A comparison of 
MILCON fund expenditures between design-build and design-bid-build projects does not 
show the whole picture.  Only when the planning and design funds are aggregated with the 
MILCON funds on design-bid-build projects can a true comparison of cost performance be 
achieved.  While this information exists within the various reporting system the “total cost” 
of a project needs to be articulated to USACE customers and the public to better demonstrate 
the true cost advantages of the design-build project delivery method. 
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 The most important step to attaining the MILCON Transformation goals will be the 
shift from the adversarial design-bid-build mentality toward a team-based design-build 
process.  This transition is well underway based upon earlier research conducted on the 
USAHFPA’s renewal program as well as the large percentage of design-build work being 
awarded by the USACE.  Only by capitalizing on past experiences with the design-build 
project delivery method and successfully leveraging that experience into future projects will 
the Army truly be able to attain the goals of MILCON Transformation. 
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APPENDIX A – DATA  ELEMENTS 
The following data elements were acquired directly from the WebCMI application or were 
calculated using the formulas shown: 
Actual BOD 
 This is the date on which beneficial occupancy occurred. 
 
Actual Construction Completion 
 This is the date that the construction was considered complete. 
 
Actual Contract Award 
 This is the award date of the contract as shown in the RMS information within the 
WebCMI application. 
 
Actual NTP 
 This is the date on which NTP was acknowledged by the contractor as shown in the RMS 
information within the WebCMI application. 
 
Adjusted Change Order Value 
( )( )[ ]FactorAdjustmentTimeACF
ValueOrderChangeValueOrderChangeAdjusted =  
 The value of approved and completed change orders is adjusted from current dollars to an 
equivalent FY07 dollar amount.  Adjustment factors for location and time were applied to 
effect this adjustment.  No adjustment for size was applied due to the disruptive nature and 
limited scope of change orders.   
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Adjusted Contract Award Amount 
 The contract award amount was adjusted for location, size, and time to convert the 
current dollar amount to an equivalent constant FY07 dollar amount. 
 
FactorAdjustmentTotal
AmountAwardContractAmountAwardContractAdjusted =  
Where: 
 ( )( )( )FactorAdjustmentSizeFactorAdjustmentTimeACFFactorAdjustmentTotal =  
 
Adjusted Controllable Changes 
 The value of the controllable changes must be adjusted from current dollars to an 
equivalent constant FY07 dollar amount.  As with change orders, this value was only 
adjusted for location and time using the following equation: 
 
( )
( )( )[ ]FactorAdjustmentTimeACF
ChangesleControllabChangesleControllabAdj =.  
 
Adjusted Construction Budget 
 The construction budget was only adjusted for time.  It was assumed that the original 
estimate had accounted for regional cost variations (ACF) as well as size variations 
(economies of scale).  The adjusted construction budget was calculated with the following 
formula: 
 
FactorAdjustmentTime
BudgetonConstructiBudgetonConstructiAdjusted =  
 
 This value may also be described as the engineer’s estimate.  The Adjusted 
Construction Budget results in a constant FY07 dollar amount.  This value was only adjusted 
for time because it was assumed that the A/E would already have accounted for project size 
and location.   
110 
 
Adjusted Estimated Design Cost 
 The following formula yields the estimated design cost in constant FY07 dollars. 
  
FactorAdjusmentTimeDesign
CostDesignEstimatedCostDesignEstimatedAdjusted =  
 
 The Design Time Adjustment Factor was used to convert the estimated design cost into 
constant FY07 dollars.  The Design Time Adjustment Factor assumes that the design contract 
is awarded one fiscal year before contract award, except for medical projects which will 
normally begin design two fiscal years prior to construction contract award (Design, 2003).  
Once assumed fiscal year of design contract award was determined then the Design Time 
Adjustment Factor was determined using the composite index for military construction funds 
as published annually by the Army Budget Office. 
 
Adjusted Final Contract Amount 
( ) ( )ValueOrderChangeAdjAmountAwardContractAdjAmountContractFinalAdj ... +=
 This is the sum of adjusted contract award amount and the adjusted change order value 
expressed in constant FY07 dollars. 
 
Adjusted Final Project Amount 
( ) ( )CostDesignEstAdjAmountContractFinalAdjAmountojectFinalAdj ...Pr. +=
 This is the sum of the adjusted final contract amount and adjusted estimated design cost 
expressed in constant FY07 dollars.  This value approximates the cost of project delivery 
from design through construction completion regardless of project delivery methodology.   
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Adjusted Initial Project Amount 
 This is a better representation of the true cost of the project because it attempts to 
incorporate the design cost in design-bid-build projects.  This value is represented in constant 
FY07 dollars and is calculated using the following formula: 
( ) ( )CostDesignEstAdjAmountAwardContractAdjAmountojectInitAdj ...Pr.. +=   
 
Authorized Year / Program Year 
 The program year is the fiscal year in which contract award is to be made with design 
starting on traditional projects one year prior to the program year for all types except 
medical.  Medical projects may start design two years prior to the program year.  The 
authorized year is the year in which authorization was received from Congress.  It is normal 
when the authorized and program years are the same, however, it is not uncommon for the 
values to differ by up to one year.   
 
Award Growth 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) 100.
.. ⋅
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −=
BudgetonConstructiAdj
BudgetonConstructiAdjAmountAwardContractAdjGrowthAward  
 
 This value is expressed as a percentage. 
 
BOD Growth 
 
( )
( ) 100⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
DurationePerformancBOD
GrowthTimeBODGrowthBOD  
 
 This metric measures how close to the planned beneficial occupancy date the project 
could accomplish it intended function.  A negative value indicates early delivery where a 
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positive value indicates delayed delivery compared to the originally promised delivery date.  
As such, this metric may indicate how well a particular project delivery method managed 
customer expectations.  This value is expressed as a percentage. 
 
BOD Performance Duration 
 
( ) ( )NTPActualBODActualDurationePerformancBOD −=  
 
 This value represents the time from NTP to BOD and is measured in calendar days. 
 
BOD Time Growth 
 This value represents the time period between the originally projected BOD and the 
actual BOD.  The following equation was derived from the WebCMI application: 
 
 ( ) ( )BODOriginalBODActualGrowthTimeBOD −=  
 
The beneficial occupancy time growth is measured in calendar days. 
 
BOD to Completion Duration 
 
( ) ( )BODActualCompletiononConstructiActualDurationCompletiontoBOD −=  
 
 This value represents the amount of time from BOD to the completion of construction 
and is predicated on the assumption that most building construction projects will achieve 
beneficial occupancy prior to or concurrent with construction completion.  The most notable 
exception to this logic is military medical facilities, which often must undergo initial 
outfitting and/or retrofit prior to occupancy.  Therefore, if the BOD occurs after construction 
completion (as in medical projects) this value will be negative.  However, a large value will 
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represent projects that may have had a negotiated phased turn-over or significant punch list 
issues.  This value is expressed in calendar days. 
 
Change Order Time 
 This is the number of days awarded as part of the approved change orders as shown in 
the RMS information within the WebCMI application.  This value is expressed in calendar 
days. 
 
Change Order Value 
 This is the value of all change orders processed and completed as shown in the RMS 
information within the WebCMI application.  This value is expressed in current dollars. 
 
Contract Award Amount 
 The contract award amount in the sum of the original contract value and the value of any 
awarded alternates expressed by the following formula: 
 
( ) ( )ExercisedOptionsContractOriginalAmountAwardContract +=  
 
 This value represents the obligation that the Government incurs by signing the contract 
and is in current dollars. 
 
Contract Controllable Cost Growth 
 This value is expressed as a percentage and does not include any design costs for 
design-bid-build projects. 
( )
( )AmountAwardContractAdj
ChangesleControllabAdjGrowthCostleControllabContract
.
.=  
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Contract Cost Growth 
 This value is expressed as a percentage.  It is important to note that this value does not 
include any design cost for design-bid-build projects. 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
AmountAwardContractAdj
AmountAwardContractAdjAmountContractFinalAdjGrowthCostContract
.
.. −=  
 
Contract Intensity 
 
DurationePerformancContract
Scope
AmountContractFinalAdj
IntensityContract
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
.
 
 
 For design-bid-build projects this does not take into account the duration or cost of 
design services.  This value is expressed as $/sf/day. 
 
Contract Number 
 This data element is a thirteen digit alphanumeric identifier for each project.  The first 
six characters of the contract number identify the service component and/or the contracting 
office issuing the contract.  The next two characters identify the fiscal year in which the 
contract was awarded.  The ninth character indicates the type of contract being awarded, such 
as “C” for construction type of contract and “D” for a delivery order type of contract.  The 
final four characters serve as a unique serial number.  In theory, each contract number should 
be unique and would serve as a method of identifying duplicate projects from the data set.  
However, for a delivery order type contract the contract number is identical for each task 
order awarded under that contract. 
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Contract Performance Duration 
 
( ) ( )NTPActualCompletiononConstructiActualDurationePerformancContract −=  
 
 This value represents the time from NTP to construction completion and is measured in 
calendar days. 
 
Contract Schedule Growth 
 
( )
( ) 100⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
DurationePerformancOriginal
DurationePerformancBODGrowthScheduleContract  
 
 This metric is used by the US Air Force as part of their “Dirt Kicker” criteria and may 
be used to determine project success.  The Air Force attempts to keep schedule growth to less 
than 10%, therefore any value less than 110% may be viewed as a success in meeting 
schedule expectations.  Any value of 100% or less indicates that the project was delivered to 
the user ahead of schedule.  This value is expressed as a percentage. 
 
Contract Time Growth 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) 100⋅⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −=
DurationContractInitial
DurationContractInitialDurationePerformancContractmeGrowthContractTi  
 
 This value is expressed as a percentage. 
 
Controllable Changes 
 Controllable Changes are defined in Resident Management System (RMS) as changes 
identified with the following codes: 
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   1 -- Engineering Changes (Includes possible and confirmed A-E Fault) 
     8 -- Value Engineering Changes 
     G -- Deficient Government Furnished Property Corrections 
     S -- Suspension of Work 
     T -- Termination of Work 
     V -- Construction Changes Necessary to Complete Contract (RMS, 2.36) 
 Uncontrollable Changes are defined in the RMS as changes identified with the following 
codes: 
     4 -- User Changes (Discretionary) 
     6 -- Miscellaneous Changes 
    7 -- Differing Site Conditions not readily identifiable by thorough Site 
       Investigation 
     9 -- Administrative Changes -- Fund Cite, Paying Station, Address, etc. 
     A -- Adverse Security Conditions 
     E -- Excusable Delay for No Fault -- Weather or Act of Nature 
     Q -- Variations in Estimated Quantities 
     R -- Revaluation -- Foreign Currency (RMS, 2.36) 
 The use of the term "controllable change" or "uncontrollable change" seems to be 
indicative of whether the impact/scope of this change is controllable by the Contractor.  A 
controllable change is similar to the unforeseen change noted in the literature review. 
 
Controllable Change Duration 
 This is the number of days awarded as part of the approved, controllable change orders 
as shown in the RMS information within the WebCMI application.  This value is expressed 
in calendar days. 
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Controllable Change Duration Ratio 
 
( )
( )TimeOrderChange
DurationChangeleControllabPortionDurationChangeleControllab =  
 
 This metric indicates how much of the total change order duration is attributed to 
controllable changes.  Based on the formula the ratios may be interpreted along a range of 
possible values from 0 to 1.  Lower ratios indicate that more of the total change order time 
was due to uncontrollable changes.  Larger ratios indicate that more of the total change order 
time was attributable to controllable changes.  
 
Controllable Change Ratio 
( )
( )ValueOrderChangeAdj
ChangesleControllabAdjPortionChangeleControllab
.
.=  
This metric indicates how much of the total change order value may be attributed to 
controllable changes.  Based on the formula shown the ratio may be interpreted along a range 
of possible values from 0 to 1.  Lower ratios indicate that more of the total value of change 
orders may be attributed to uncontrollable changes.  Larger ratios indicate that more of the 
total value of change orders may be attributed to controllable changes.  If the ratio is greater 
than 1 then the uncontrollable changes resulted in a net credit.  Similarly, if the ratio is less 
than 0 the controllable changes resulted in a net credit. 
 
Construction Budget 
 This value was equated to the A/E’s estimated cost or the Engineer’s estimate. 
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Construction Placement 
 
( )
( )DurationePerformancContract
AmountContractFinalAdjPlacementonConstructi .=  
 
 This metric represents the average rate at which the construction contractor earns value 
over the contract period.  The larger values of construction placement represent effective and 
efficient construction management.  This value is expressed as $/day. 
 
Corps District 
 This is the Corps of Engineers district office with direct oversight and reporting 
responsibilities for the project.  Typically, districts are organized along geographical 
boundaries. 
 
Delivery Type 
 Projects were classified as either “design-build” or “traditional” based on interpretation 
of the “Design-by” data field, project description, synopsis, or authorized phase values in 
WebCMI.   
 
Design-Build Placement 
 
( )
( )DurationePerformancContract
AmountContractFinalAdjPlacementDB .=  
 
 This value is expressed as $/day. 
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Design-by 
 The values in the data set are direct reflections of the USACE design-by codes listed in 
the P2 information management system.  The allowable values used in this study are listed in 
Chapter 3, Table 5.  
 
Design Duration 
 
( ) ( )DateStartDesignDateCompletionDesignDurationDesign −=  
 
 This value represents the period of time used to complete the bid drawings and 
specifications.  Therefore this duration only applies to design-bid-build projects and is 
measured in calendar days.  For design-build projects the design duration is already included 
in the contract performance period. 
 
Design Placement 
 
( )
( )DurationDesign
CostDesignEstAdjPlacementDesign ..=  
 
 This metric is the average cost per day of the design contract, however, in this data set 
it is the estimated cost per day.  This value is expressed as $/day. 
 
Design Time Adjustment Factor 
 This adjustment factor reflects the fact that design costs are paid and executed prior to the 
award of a construction contract under the traditional project delivery method.  It was 
approximated that design started one year prior to the fiscal year of contract award for all 
types of facilities, except medical which was approximated at two years.  This adjustment 
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factor allows the current dollar amount of the estimated design cost to be converted to an 
equivalent constant FY07 dollar amount. 
 
Estimated Design Cost 
 
( )( )06.0ContractOriginalCostDesignEstimated =  
 
 The Estimated Design Cost is only applicable to design-bid-build projects as the 
design cost for design-build projects is already included in the contract award amount.  A 6% 
fee limit for architectural and engineering services on federal projects was enacted in 1939 
(Charles, 1996).  The fee limit for architectural and engineering services on MILCON 
projects is 6% of the estimated cost of construction.  This statutory limit applies only to the 
“production and delivery of designs, plans, drawings, and specifications for construction.  
Some non-design services which are exempt from the 6% limit are: project development, 
feasibility studies, site investigation, construction inspection, shop drawing review, etc (AR 
415-15, 1998).    
 For the purposes of this study it was assumed that the design cost for design-bid-build 
projects was 6% of the base contract award amount (without additives or options).  The 
A/E’s estimate is used to determine the program amount for a project prior to bid solicitation.  
If bids come in over the program amount then all bids may be rejected.  As such, it would be 
expected that the bids and contract award amounts are actually lower than the estimated 
construction cost.  Therefore, while the estimated design cost is a good approximation it does 
not account for all of the design costs for a design-bid-build project. 
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Initial Contract Duration 
 This is the sum of the original duration and options duration measured in calendar 
days. 
( ) ( )DurationOptionsDurationContractDurationContractInitial +=  
 
Installation 
 This data element identified geographically where the project was executed. 
 
Facility Type – Detailed 
 The project description field was used to determine the type of facility being constructed 
based on facility types used in the USACE project programming process. (Unit, 2006; 
Programming, 1994) 
 
Facility Type – General 
 The detailed facility type was consolidated to allow for comparison of similar facility 
projects.  In this study there were fifteen general facility classifications. 
 
Final Allowable Contract Duration 
 
( ) ( )TimeOrderChangeDurationContractInitialDurationContractAllowableFinal +=  
 This value is measured in calendar days. 
 
Final Contract Amount 
 This is the sum of the original contract, options exercised and change order value 
expressed by the following formula: 
( ) ( )ValueOrderChangeAmountAwardContractAmountContractFinal +=  
 The final contract amount is in current dollars. 
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Fund Type 
 Different types of funding within the federal government include different restrictions 
and allowable uses.  For example operations and maintenance (O&M) funds may only be 
used to perform maintenance and repairs, new construction work up to an identified statutory 
limit, and “expire” at the end of the year of appropriation.  Military construction funds are 
multi-year funds that may be used for the construction of new or renovation/repair of existing 
facilities.  The type of funding used on a project was collected to ensure that all projects were 
governed by similar regulations. 
 
LEED Rating 
 This is the LEED rating achieved by the project as part of the effort of the federal 
government to construct green facilities.   
 
Number of Changes 
 This is the number of change orders processed and completed as shown in the RMS 
information within the WebCMI application. 
 
Options Duration 
 This is the time period allowed for any awarded alternates measured in calendar days. 
 
Options Exercised 
 This is the value of any alternates awarded. 
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Original BOD 
 This is the date originally established for beneficial occupancy by the project delivery 
team within 30 days of contract award. 
 
Original Construction Completion 
 This is the date originally established for construction completion as shown in the RMS 
information within the WebCMI application. 
 
Original Contract 
 This is the value of the base bid for the project in current dollars. 
 
Original Duration 
 This is the original performance period for project’s base bid measured in calendar 
days. 
 
Original Performance Duration 
 
( ) ( )NTPActualBODOriginalDurationePerformancOriginal −=  
 
 This value represents the time from NTP to the originally projected BOD, which is 
established by the project delivery team (PDT) shortly after contract award.  This value is 
expressed in calendar days. 
 
Program Amount 
 This is the programmed amount that was identified early in the MILCON process.   
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Project Controllable Cost Growth 
 This value is expressed as a percentage and includes an approximate value for the 
design cost on design-bid-build projects. 
( )
( )AmountojectInitialAdj
ChangesleControllabAdjGrowthCostleControllaboject
Pr.
.Pr =  
 
Project Cost Growth 
 This value is expressed as a percentage and includes an approximate value for the 
design cost on design-bid-build projects. 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
( )AmountojectInitialAdj
AmountojectInitialAdjAmountojectFinalAdjGrowthCostoject
Pr.
Pr.Pr.Pr −=  
 
Project Description 
 The project description is a rough description of the project.  The contents of this data 
field were different for each Corps District and may include additional information such as 
fiscal year, type of funding, contract number, etc.  
 
Project Intensity 
( )DurationDesignDurationePerformancContract
Scope
AmountojectFinalAdj
Intensityoject +
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
Pr.
Pr  
 
 For design-bid-build project this metric estimates the cost of design services and uses 
known design contract times as reported by webCMI.  This value is expressed as $/sf/day. 
 
Project Placement (Design-Bid-Build Projects) 
 
( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]DurationePerformancContractDurationDesign
AmountContractFinalAdjCostDesignEstAdjPlacementoject +
+= .(.Pr  
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 This value is expressed as $/day. 
 
Project Placement (Design-Build Projects) 
 
PlacementDBPlacementoject =Pr  
 
 This value is expressed as $/day. 
 
Project Type 
 The project type is on multiple fields in the WebCMI project file.  The possible values 
for this data element were limited to “Addition/Alteration” and “New/Replacement” with the 
later being the default value.  This assumes that each construction project is to replace an 
existing facility or function, which based on current facility inventory ages, energy 
conservation targets, and the need to dispose of World War II wooden structures is a valid 
assumption.  However, if text in the project description, optional RMS synopsis field, or the 
Federal Business Opportunities database indicated otherwise, the value was changed to 
“Addition/Alteration.” 
 
Region 
 Based on the installation data element the project was assigned to one of five distinct 
geographical regions as shown in Figure 5.  Earlier research on federal design-build projects 
attempted to determine if a geographic relationship existed and divided the continental US 
into four regions.  With the current data set a fifth region was added to include projects 
executed outside of the continental US (OCONUS). 
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Scheduled BOD 
 This is the date for beneficial occupancy that was updated during the construction 
process. 
 
Scheduled Contract Award 
 This is the date originally scheduled to award the contract as shown in the RMS 
information within the WebCMI application. 
 
Scheduled NTP 
 This is the date originally scheduled to issue notice-to-proceed (NTP) as shown in the 
RMS information within the WebCMI application. 
 
Scheduled Construction Completion 
 This is the construction completion date adjusted to include the approved change order 
durations as shown in the RMS information within the WebCMI application. 
 
Unit Cost (Design-Bid-Build Projects) 
 
( ) ( )
Scope
AmountContractFinalAdjCostDesignEstAdjCostUnit ... +=  
 
 This metric indicates the cost per square foot of facility constructed using the design-
bid-build project delivery method.  By inclusion of the estimated design costs in this metric 
comparison with design-build projects may be made.  This value is expressed in $/sf. 
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Unit Cost (Design-Build Projects) 
 
( )
Scope
AmountContractFinalAdjCostUnit .=  
 
 This metric indicates the cost per square foot of the facility using the design-build 
project delivery method.  This value is expressed in $/sf. 
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APPENDIX B – ANALYSIS SUMMARY SHEETS 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
Table B-1.  Design-build project aggregate vs. design-bid-build project aggregate. 
 
130 
Table B-2. Southeast region DB projects vs. Southeast region DBB projects. 
 
131 
Table B-3.  Northeast region DB projects vs. Northeast region DBB projects. 
 
132 
Table B-4.  Northwest region DB projects vs. Northwest region DBB projects. 
 
133 
Table B-5.  Southwest region DB projects vs. Southwest region DBB projects. 
 
134 
Table B-6.  OCONUS DB projects vs. OCONUS DBB projects. 
 
135 
Table B-7.  Medical type DB projects vs. Medical type DBB projects. 
 
136 
Table B-8.  Public safety DB projects vs. Public safety DBB projects. 
 
137 
Table B-9. Special type DB projects vs. Special type DBB projects. 
 
138 
Table B-10.  Training type DB projects vs. Training type DBB projects. 
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Table B-11. Barracks DB projects vs. Barracks DBB projects. 
 
140 
Table B-12. Maint. - Aviation DB projects vs. Maint. - Aviation DBB projects. 
 
141 
Table B-13. Administrative Type DB projects vs. Administrative Type DBB projects. 
 
142 
Table B-14. Maint. - Ground DB projects vs. Maint. - Ground DBB projects. 
 
143 
Table B-15. Mobility type DB projects vs. Mobility type DBB projects. 
 
144 
Table B-16. Storage type DB projects vs. Storage type DBB projects. 
 
145 
Table B-17. Food service type DB projects vs. Food service type DBB projects. 
 
146 
Table B-18. Security type DB projects vs. Security type DBB projects. 
 
147 
Table B-19. Micro DB projects vs. Micro DBB projects. 
 
148 
Table B-20. Small DB projects vs. Small DBB projects. 
 
149 
Table B-21. Medium DB projects vs. Medium DBB projects. 
 
150 
Table B-22.  Northwest region DB projects vs. DB project aggregate. 
 
151 
Table B-23. Southwest Region DB projects vs. DB project aggregate. 
 
152 
Table B-24. Northeast Region DB projects vs. DB project aggregate. 
 
153 
Table B-25. Southeast Region DB projects vs. DB aggregate. 
 
154 
Table B-26. Micro DB projects vs. Micro DBB projects. 
 
155 
Table B-27. Small DB projects vs. Small DBB projects. 
 
156 
Table B-28. Medium DB projects vs. Medium DBB projects 
 
157 
Table B-29. Mobile district DB projects vs. Mobile district DBB projects. 
 
158 
Table B-30. Savannah district DB projects vs. Savannah district DBB projects. 
 
159 
Table B-31. Kansas City district DB projects vs. Kansas City DBB projects. 
 
160 
Table B-32. Little Rock district DB projects vs. Little Rock district DBB projects. 
 
161 
Table B-33. Honolulu district DB projects vs. Honolulu district DBB projects. 
 
162 
Table B-34. Tulsa district DB projects vs. Tulsa District DBB projects. 
 
163 
Table B-35. Alaska district DB projects vs. Alaska district DBB projects. 
 
164 
Table B-36. Sacramento district DB projects vs. Sacramento district DBB projects. 
 
165 
Table B-37. Baltimore district DB projects vs. Baltimore district DBB projects. 
 
166 
Table B-38. Louisville district DB projects vs. Louisville district DBB projects. 
 
167 
Table B-39. Omaha district DB projects vs. Omaha district DBB projects. 
 
168 
Table B-40.  Fort Worth district DB projects vs. Fort Worth district DBB projects. 
 
169 
Table B-41. Los Angeles district DB projects vs. Los Angeles district DBB projects. 
 
170 
Table B-42. Seattle district DB projects vs. Seattle district DBB projects. 
 
171 
Table B-43. Norfolk district DB projects vs. Norfolk DBB projects. 
 
172 
Table B-44. European district DB projects vs. European district DBB projects. 
 
173 
Table B-45. Albuquerque district DB projects vs. Albuquerque DBB projects. 
 
174 
Table B-46. Two-phase DB projects vs. DBB project aggregate. 
 
175 
Table B-47. Single-phase DB projects vs. DBB project aggregate. 
 
176 
Table B-48. MATOC DB projects vs. DBB project aggregate. 
 
 
177 
Table B-49. Community type DB projects vs. Community DBB projects. 
 
178 
Table B-50. Analysis of Variance for design-build projects by district. 
 
179 
Table B-51. Analysis of variance for design-build projects by facility type. 
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